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CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
The three essays that constitute this dissertation aim to understand the role of 
agribusiness organizational structures in competition, the risk management practices of grain 
producers, and the characteristics of the U.S. corn harvest futures price. 
The cooperative (co-op) model is held up as a novel solution to many kinds of market 
failures. It integrates the business successes and members’ utilities and provides a countervailing 
force to the market power of investor-owned firms (IOFs). A traditional cooperative business is 
characterized as being owned and controlled by its member-users, to whom benefits are intended 
to primarily accrue. The user-benefit principle has given rise to diverse assumptions regarding 
the objectives of co-ops in the existing literature. And the theoretical literature has yet to 
reconcile the extent to which operating objectives of a cooperative business deviate from profit 
maximization. Chapter 2 adds to the literature by developing a model of duopsony competition 
from which the strategic interactions of a cooperative firm and an investor owned firm (IOF) 
under output price uncertainty are interpreted.  I analyze the way in which the market 
equilibrium varies as the co-op takes on different objectives. 
Crop producers’ risk management practices have long been understood using either 
survey based data or aggregate trading data. These studies suggest there is limited relevance of 
Expected Utility (EU) optimal hedging theory as farmers may deviate from rationality. There are 
two impediments to this line of research. First, hedging theories that rely on alternative utility 
paradigms may be too complicated to test with data.  Second, there is a lack of data on the actual 
hedging activities of producers. Chapter 3 provides a solution that partially overcomes these two 
problems. I investigate the role of reference-dependence, a central feature of most utility 
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paradigms other than EU in the optimal hedging theory under the EU framework. The theoretical 
predictions facilitate a direct comparison of optimal hedge ratios with and without a reference 
price. I then test the model’s results with a unique database of forward contracting transactions of 
Iowa corn producers over a five-year period. The corn producers’ hedging pattern indeed appears 
to be reference-dependent: more hedges are placed when futures prices rise above the recent 
price trend. This finding has important implications for future research on grain producers’ 
marketing practices because if the futures markets are efficient, price-based triggers as a 
motivation for hedging may not be beneficial to farm income.    
A well-known phenomenon in the corn futures market, weather premium, suggests that 
producers may enhance their marketing strategies by forward contracting early in the season.  
This is because the commodity futures market for grain over-predicts the actual harvest price 
more often than not. Chapter 4 formally defines the weather premium, and recovers the potential 
weather premium in the corn futures market. I show theoretically that the size of weather 
premium depends on the expected supply at harvest, which consists of the carryout from last year 
and the expected new harvest. These two covariates partially explain the variation of the forecast 
error of the December futures contract price from 1968 to 2015. However, the existence of 
weather premium does not imply the biasness in the futures, i.e. risk premium. The Sharpe ratio 
of the passive strategy of routinely shorting the corn December futures in spring is too small to 
justify such an approach.  
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CHAPTER 2 
DUOPSONY COMPETITION FOR GRAIN AND PRICING STRATEGIES OF 
AGRICULTURAL MARKETING COOPERATIVES 
 
Abstract 
This article reconciles theories of firm pricing behavior when a cooperative and non-
cooperative firm engage in competition for grain. Standard theoretical models of firm 
behavior require the researcher to choose an operational motive for the firm, and a standard 
assumption is profit maximization. The unique governance and economic participation 
features of cooperatives suggest, however, that not only is profit maximization an unlikely 
objective, choosing a single objective for a cooperative firm may not be appropriate.  A 
cooperative’s objective reflects the degree to which it is integrated with its member-owners, 
thus integrating buyers and sellers.  We propose a theoretical model of duopsony under 
uncertainty from which the pricing behaviors and market share outcomes of cooperative 
firms with their investor-owned counterparts can be compared.  Our specific focus is on 
characterizing the market equilibriums for the cooperative firm with varying degrees of 
integration with its member producers.   
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Introduction 
Cooperatives are integrated with their customers (members) in a way that their non-
cooperative counterparts are not. The hallmarks of a cooperative business are member-ownership, 
member-control, and benefits derived primarily to members on a proportional basis.  That is, the 
cooperative firm is governed by and capitalized by those who use its services, and those who use it 
also share in the resulting profits and losses.   This unique organizational structure suggest that 
cooperatives may not strictly seek profit maximization. Instead, the operating objectives of 
cooperatives are commonly perceived on a spectrum, from maximizing co-op’s profit (e.g. Sexton, 
1990), to vertical integration with members (e.g. Sexton and Iskow, 1993), to maximizing 
members’ on-farm profit (e.g. Albæk and Schultz, 1998). Soboh et al. (2009) provide a recent 
review of cooperative objectives. Each of the candidate objectives reflects an aspect of 
cooperative’s business model, and the differences among them reside in the implicit assumption 
about the degree of interconnection between members and the cooperative. 
 The effects on prices and market shares of the integration with members and the co-op’s 
operational choices are best viewed through their strategic interactions with investor owned firms 
(IOFs).  Previous literature has investigated interactions and outcomes of cooperative firms and 
IOFs.  Karantininis and Zago (2001) and (Fulton and Giannakas (2001), study the role of the 
cooperative in promoting competition and Giannakas and Fulton (2005) identify the role of 
competition on innovation.  A missing component in this literature is an explicit linkage of the 
degree of integration between the co-op and its producer-members with implications for 
equilibrium pricing and market shares of competing firms in an imperfectly competitive market. 
In this article, we build a theoretical model that is sufficiently flexible to incorporate a range 
of operational objectives of a marketing cooperative, and then derive the equilibrium price and 
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market share outcomes under different objective regimes based on strategic interactions of a 
cooperative firm with an IOF.  The competition environment is structured as a duopsony where two 
grain marketing firms – one a profit-maximizing IOF, the other an open-membership1 
cooperative – engage in price competition to buy grain from a risk-averse representative 
member.  The member is assumed to make a crop allocation decision by maximizing the 
expected utility of his crop sale. The member experiences some uncertainty in this decision 
because the cooperative profits or losses are part of his expected function, the IOF profits or 
losses are not. 
Our analysis explicitly accounts for the level of integration of the cooperative and its 
members in two ways. First, we allow the cooperative’s objectives to vary along a spectrum: the 
co-op is considered more integrated as its objective moves towards maximizing the member’s 
on-farm profit, and less so if it behaves more like a profit-maximizing firm. Secondly, we 
assume a random final product price at the time firms make their input purchase decisions. The 
uncertain nature of the cooperative’s business has implications for the cooperative’s pricing 
behavior, but it also influences producers’ decisions about whether to transact with the 
cooperative because of the linkage between producers and cooperative through patronage. In 
other words, the relative risk appetite of cooperative to its member affects the equilibrium 
outcomes.  
                                                             
 
1 Open membership is standard assumption in cooperative literature; it presumes that the farmer-
member is not committed to selling through the cooperative. 
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This game characterizes the situation in which a group of similar risk-averse farmers 
countervails the market power of an IOF through a marketing co-op, without the existence of 
which the IOF would be the only game in town and would pay zero dollar for members’ crop. 
Members in turn have to face the uncertainty of the cooperative’s profit, which they will receive 
later as patronage refunds. The model results shed lights on an important disconnect in the 
cooperative literature between theories and empirical observations. We shows that a co-op has a 
narrower margin and a smaller market share than the IOF regardless of how it weighs in its 
objective between the profit of the company and its members. This competitive disadvantage of 
cooperatives provides one explanation to the continuing restructuring of marketing/supply 
cooperatives in the U.S. as shown in figure 1. And despite its importance, the cooperative business 
model has yet to become the dominant form of agribusiness in the United States measured by the 
market share.   
 
Figure 1. Marketing Cooperatives: Sizes, Sales and Shares 
Note. The aggregate time series plots show the characteristic facts of the U.S. agricultural marketing 
cooperatives in 1951 - 2007. The number of co-ops series has the y-axis labeling on the left. The net sales 
series has the y-axis labeling on the right. The market share series has y-axis in the unit interval. Data 
Sources: United States Department of Agriculture, Rural Development, Cooperatives Historical Data; United 
States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Farm Income and Wealth Statistics. 
7 
 
    
 
Empirical literature aiming to explain the continuing restructuring of agricultural co-ops and the 
diminishing market share have focused on co-op’s operating inefficiencies (Sexton et al., 1989; 
Crooks, 2001; Hailu et al., 2007) and capital constraints (Featherstone et al., 1995; Chaddad et al., 
2004; Soboh et al., 2012; Li et al., 2015). These literature often take an agnostic approach with 
regard to the relationship between the co-ops’ objectives and their operating decisions, which limits 
the implications of relative importance of different factors that contribute to the secular decline of 
the cooperative as a business model in the grain marketing industry.  
In the next section, we describe the model framework that encompasses the price 
competition between a marketing co-op and an IOF, and the allocation decision of a 
representative producer under uncertainty. We then analyze the equilibrium outcome as the result 
of the strategic interactions among the firms and the producer, and how it changes as the co-op’s 
objective varies. Finally, we conclude the article by comparing our model to the Cook’s (1995) 
seminar paper that describes the challenges to traditional agricultural cooperatives via the neo-
institutional approach. 
 
A Duoposonistic Market for Agricultural Output with a Cooperative and IOF  
We consider a three period model of duopsony in which two processors – a cooperative 
and an IOF – engage in price competition in the local market for producers’ grain. In the first 
period, the cooperative and the IOF simultaneously announce the price they will pay for any 
amount of grain.  In the second period, the producer’s crop is allocated by selling a portion of 
grain to each processor. In the third period, the price of the processed commodity is revealed and 
the firms’ profits are realized.  The important linkage in this model occurs between the 
cooperative processor and the producer. In this model, the cooperative’s profit is assumed to be 
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fully distributed to the representative producer who allocated grain to the cooperative in the 
second period.  This linkage is understood when the crop allocation decision is made, and the 
producer incorporates uncertainty of the firm’s profits in his decision problem. 
The model is solved by backwards induction.  In what follows, we describe the producers’ 
allocation decision and the processors’ production technology.  We derive the optimal pricing 
response functions for both firms when the unknown cooperative objective can include a 
spectrum of operational objectives ranging from maximizing the firm’s profits to maximizing the 
producers’ profitability.   
 
Producer’s crop allocation decision 
A representative producer makes his crop allocation decision in period two based on the 
announced prices of the two processors in period one. The producer can allocate any portion of 
his grain, 𝛿, to the cooperative and receive price 𝑤𝑐.  He receives price 𝑤𝑝 for the amount of 
grain, (1 − 𝛿), allocated to the IOF.  Selling grain to the cooperative necessarily results in a return 
of the cooperative’s profitability in the form of patronage in the third period, which can be 
positive or negative.  The producer maximizes his expected utility from allocating grain between 
the cooperative and IOF with uncertainty over the profit of the cooperative.  We assume a 
constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) form of utility, 𝑢(𝑦) = −𝑒−𝜌𝑦, where 𝜌 is the 
producer’s coefficient of absolute risk aversion.  The producer’s income, y, takes the form: 
(1) 𝑦 = (1 − 𝛿)𝑤𝑝 + 𝛿𝑤𝑐 + 𝛽𝜋(𝑤𝑐 , 𝛿, 𝑝),  
where 𝜋(∙) is the cooperative’s profit and 𝛽 ∈ [0,1] is the discount factor applied to the patronage 
received in the following period. The producer may not regard the cash payment and patronage 
refund as the same because of his time preference and risk attitude. Patronage refund today is 
9 
 
    
 
always better than tomorrow, because as long as it is at the co-op, it is at risk for the co-op’s profit is 
uncertain. The cooperative’s profit is a function of the grain price, its allocation of the farmer’s 
grain, and the price of the final product, p.  This function is detailed in the following section. We 
impose normality of the cooperative’s profit, implying the producer’s expected utility of income, 
𝐸(𝑢(𝑦)), can be expressed  𝐸(𝑦) −
1
2
𝜌𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑦) where 𝐸(∙)and 𝑉𝑎𝑟(∙) denote the mean and 
variance, respectively.  The producer’s problem is:  
(2)   max
𝛿∈(0,1)
{ (1 − 𝛿)𝑤𝑝 + 𝛿𝑤𝑐 + 𝛽𝐸𝜋(𝑤𝑐 , 𝛿, 𝑝) −
1
2
𝜌𝛽2𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜋(𝑤𝑐 , 𝛿, 𝑝))} ,  
Use 𝜋 as the abbreviation for the cooperative’s profit function, the producer’s optimal allocation 
decision satisfies:  
(3)           𝑤𝑐 −𝑤𝑝 + 𝛽𝜕𝐸π/𝜕𝛿
∗ −
1
2
𝜌𝛽2𝜕𝑣𝑎𝑟π/𝜕𝛿∗ = 0   
This modeling makes explicit that producers must invest in the cooperative to use it and 
incorporates Staatz’s (1987) recognition that the decision to use a cooperative deepens a 
producer’s financial commitment to a single firm rather than diversifying it. Specifically, the 
producer needs to tradeoff between the benefit of patronizing with the co-op and risk associated 
with the patronage refund. We describe a simple technology function in the next section for the 
marketing firm that will make this tradeoff mathematically straightforward.  
 
Processors’ production technology, profit and market shares 
Firms face identical production technologies that use grain and other inputs to produce a 
homogenous final product.  We assume the firms’ production is Leontief with respect to grain 
and requires fixed proportions of all other inputs.  Formally, the firms’ production is: 
10 
 
    
 
(4) 𝑞 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛[𝑥0, 𝑓(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑘)], 
where 𝑞 is output quantity, 𝑥0 is the quantity of grain purchased from producers, and 𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑘 
are other inputs purchased from competitive markets at exogenous prices.  Firms optimally 
employ non-grain inputs such that 𝑥0 = 𝑞, and the firms’ cost functions are: 
(5) 𝐶(𝑞, 𝑤𝑖) = 𝑤𝑖𝑞 + 𝑐𝑞, 
where i denotes cooperative or IOF and the constant 𝑐 is the minimized cost of the inputs 
𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑘 required to produce one unit of output.  Constant marginal costs of storing, processing, 
and marketing the final product derives from homogeneity of the production function.2 The final 
good of each firm is homogeneous and sold in a competitive market at price, 𝑝, and is assumed 
to follow a normal distribution, 𝑝 ~𝑁(?̅?, 𝜎2).  The price distribution is known by both firms but 
the price is not known until the third period.  The resulting profit function is:  
(6) 𝜋𝑖(𝑞,𝑤𝑖 , 𝑝) = (𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝑤𝑖)𝑞,   𝑠. 𝑡.   0 ≤ 𝑤𝑖 ≤ ?̅? − 𝑐.     
The non-negativity constraint on firms’ expected profits, regardless of their operational objectives, 
is necessary to ensure they do not operate with expected losses, which will result in shut down. It is 
                                                             
 
2 Suppose the production function is homogeneous of degree 𝛾 with respect to 𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑘. Denote 
 𝐶
~
(𝑞) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑤𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 , subject to 𝑓(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑘) ≥ 𝑞. The cost function satisfies 𝐶
~
(𝑞) = (𝑞) =
𝐶
~
(1)𝑞
1
𝛾. Denote 𝑐 = 𝐶
~
(1), which is a function of the exogenous input prices 𝑤1, … , 𝑤𝑘 , hence a 
constant. 
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possible that both firms realize negative profits without this constraint, however, because of bad 
realization of the output price.  
Under the Leontief technology, firms’ output level is equal to the amount of grain they are 
able to buy from the producer, which is also their respective market shares as the total amount of 
grain is normalized to one. Thus we can write the expected profit and its variance as 
𝐸[𝜋(𝛿, 𝑤𝑐 , 𝑝)] = (𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝑤𝑐)𝛿, and 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝜋(𝛿, 𝑤𝑐 , 𝑝)] = 𝜎
2𝛿2 respectively. Substitute the 
expected profit and variance of the profit of the cooperative firm into equation (3), we obtain the 
producer’s optimal allocation to the co-op:   
(7)   𝛿∗(𝑤𝑐 , 𝑤𝑝) = [𝑤𝑐 −𝑤𝑝 + 𝛽(𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝑤𝑐)]/𝜌𝛽
2𝜎2 
and 1 − 𝛿∗(𝑤𝑐 , 𝑤𝑝) is the market share for the IOF.  
 
IOF’s price response 
An IOF and cooperative that engage in price competition in the grain market do so by deriving 
response functions for grain prices they will announce to the producer. Both firms consider the 
other’s pricing decisions, and know the optimal allocation function of the producer conditional 
on the mill price offers. The risk neutral IOF chooses its grain price, 𝑤𝑝, based on what it expects 
the cooperative firm’s grain price to be.  The IOF’s expected profit maximization problem is:  
(8) 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑤𝑝
(𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝑤𝑝)[1 − 𝛿
∗(𝑤𝑐 , 𝑤𝑝)].       
The producer’s possible allocation scenarios are given in equation 7, and these will determine the 
extent of the market.  Either the IOF receives all the grain (𝛿∗ = 0), the cooperative does (𝛿∗ =
1), or the two firms split the market (0 < 𝛿∗ < 1).  When the latter holds, the expected profit of 
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the IOF is differentiable and globally concave with respect to its price, 𝑤𝑝, and the IOF’s price 
strategy is obtained from the first-order condition: 
(9)  𝑤𝑝
∗ = 𝑎𝑝 + 𝑏𝑝𝑤𝑐 ,   
  where  𝑎𝑝 =
1
2
[(1 + 𝛽)(𝑝 − 𝑐) − 𝜌𝛽2𝜎2],   
                   𝑏𝑝 =
1
2
(1 − 𝛽), 
s.t. 𝑤𝑐 ∈ (𝑝 − 𝑐 −
𝜌𝛽2𝜎2
1+𝛽⏟        
𝑤𝑐
, 𝑝 − 𝑐 +
𝜌𝛽2𝜎2
1+𝛽⏟        
𝑤𝑐
). 
The range of the co-op’s price offer is to ensure that the IOF’s price as it depends on that of the 
co-op, to be nonnegative and the resulting expected profit is also greater than or equal to zero. 
Specifically, if 𝑤𝑐 < 𝑤𝑐, the IOF will capture the entire market share; if the co-op’s price offer is 
too high: larger than 𝑤𝑐, then the IOF will choose to exit the market. The complete solution to 
equation 8 is provided in the Appendix A. The corner solution of this model echoes the idea of 
entry deterrence in the endogenous market structure literature (Hueth and Moschini, 2014). For 
example, even if the co-op’s price offer is too low such that IOF becomes the only firm in the 
market, facing the threat of entry, IOF’s offer price must set the price greater than 𝛽(𝑝 − 𝑐) +
(1 − 𝛽) 𝑤𝑐, namely the entry deterrence price.  
 The co-op’s role as a competitive yardstick is best seen when 𝛽 = 1, the producer and co-
op is vertically integrated. In this situation, the co-op is just an extension of members’ business 
as if there is only one decision maker. This special case is nested in our model framework, as 
show in equation 9, the IOF’s pricing strategy will not depend on the price offer by the co-op 
anymore and the producer’s per unit expected payoff is  𝑝 − 𝑐, the marketing margin of the grain 
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business.  So the optimal pricing by the IOF is (𝑝 − 𝑐) −
1
2
𝜌𝜎2, and substituting (9) into (7) 
yields the IOF’s market share ½.   
However, a complete vertical integration assumption is neither realistic nor very useful in 
understanding the co-op’s operating behavior in relation to its IOF counterpart. Thus, in the rest 
of the article, we focus on the situation where 𝛽 < 1, that is the producer prefers the payment 
today than tomorrow. To further facilitate the remaining analysis, we impose the following 
parameter restriction:  (1 + 𝛽) (𝑝 − 𝑐) = 𝜌𝛽2𝜎2. This is a special case in the range of firm’s 
expected marketing margin that supports the interior solution. In the absence of it, most of our 
findings in the following sections still hold. However, this constraint is appealing for two reasons. 
First, the best response functions are linear and differentiable, which generates a unique, dominance 
solvable equilibrium. Second, the assumption implies that the IOF’s best response function evaluated 
at 𝑤𝑐 = 0 is zero, namely 𝑎𝑝 = 0. In other words, the possible entry deterrence price offer by the 
IOF is normalized to zero.  Intuitively, when the co-op offers zero dollar for the producer’s crop, 
the IOF has no incentive to offer more. The slope 𝑏𝑝 represents the sensitivity IOF’s best 
response to the co-op’s price offer, which is smaller than one.   
 
The cooperative’s price response  
The cooperative firm’s pricing strategy hinges on not only the price offer by the IOF, but 
also its own business objective. Standard modeling presumes the investor-owned firms – private 
or public – are risk neutral profit maximizers. However, a representative cooperative firm’s 
preferences and objectives are not easily pegged. Those who use it also control it, capitalize it 
through use, and share in its profitability.  This suggests that the cooperative may not be a profit 
maximizing firm, but selects from a suite of objectives that range from maximizing producers’ 
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profits to maximizing its own expected profits.  Also, as agents for the producer, the cooperative 
may adopt either a neutral or averse risk appetite.  Because a cooperative’s objectives are not 
transparent, a model that permits flexibility in considering any convex combination of 
cooperative business objectives in combination with risk preferences is necessary. 
The cooperative’s objective function is given by:  
(10) 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑤𝑐
  𝛼𝛿∗𝑤𝑐 + (1 − 𝛼)𝛿
∗[(𝑝 − 𝑤𝑐 − 𝑐) −
1
2
𝜃𝜎2𝛿∗],  
                                 s.t. 0 ≤ 𝜃 < 𝛽2𝜌, and 𝛼 ∈ [0, 1 −
2
(1−𝛽)𝜁+4
].  
 𝛼 weights the trade-off between the cash price paid to producers for grain and the profitability of 
the firm (future patronage refund paid to producers) and θ is the cooperative’s abso lutely level of 
risk aversion.  
We impose  0 ≤ 𝜃 < 𝛽2𝜌  to restrict attention to the case where the cooperative is less 
risk averse than the producer.3 Define 𝜁 ≡ 𝜃/𝛽2𝜌 as the relative risk aversion of the co-op to 
producers, and it follows from the restriction 0 ≤ 𝜁 < 1. Note the producer’s risk aversion 
coefficient is adjusted for his time preference, which together reflect his attitude toward the risk 
associated with the patronage refund that will be distributed later in time.   
The weighting parameter 𝛼 reflects the co-op’s balance between the producers’ cash 
payment and its own profitability. 𝛼 ∈ [0, 1 −
2
(1−𝛽)𝜁+4
] is  the necessary and sufficient condition 
for co-op’s objective function being concave.  
                                                             
 
3The cooperative firm pools risk and has access to lower-cost technologies in storage, thus 
implying though a cooperative may be risk averse, it is less so than the representative producer. 
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A pair of 𝛼 and θ describes a unique cooperative’s objective function that is observable to 
the producer.  The cooperative firm’s altruism towards members is directly signaled via 𝛼, while 
the upper bound of 𝛼 depends on the producer’s time preference and the co-op’s risk attitude 
relative to the producer. We analyze in the next section how these signals would affect the market 
equilibrium.   
Similar to the IOF’s price response, the co-op’s optimal price offer, 𝑤𝑐
∗, based on IOF’s 
grain price is given by:  
(11)            𝑤𝑐
∗ = 𝑎𝑐 + 𝑏𝑐 ⋅ 𝑤𝑝   
 
              
where 𝑎𝑐 =
(𝑝−𝑐){(1−𝛼)[(𝛽−1)𝛽𝜁+(1−2𝛽)]+𝛼𝛽}
(1−𝛽)[2(1−2𝛼)+(1−𝛼)(1−𝛽)𝜁]
 
 
                   𝑏𝑐 =
(1−2𝛼)+(1−𝛽)(1−𝛼)𝜁
(1−𝛽)[2(1−2𝛼)+(1−𝛼)(1−𝛽)𝜁]
. 
  The varying cooperative’s objectives, governed by parameters 𝜁 and 𝛼, affects the market 
equilibrium prices through its impact on the cooperative’s best response function characterized 
by 𝑎𝑐(𝜁, 𝛼), 𝑏𝑐(𝜁, 𝛼). The possible combinations of 𝜁, 𝛼 give rise to four distinct objective 
functions of the cooperative: 1) risk neutral profit maximizer (𝜁 = 𝛼 = 0), 2) risk-averse profit 
maximizer (𝜁 > 0, 𝛼 = 0), 3) risk-neutral altruistic firm (𝜁 = 0, 𝛼 > 0), and finally the general 
case with a dual nature co-op, 𝜁 > 0, 𝛼 > 0. Thus, to analyze the equilibrium outcomes under 
different co-op objectives, we need to first understand the trajectory of co-op’s best response 
function as it moves along the objective spectrum.  
The slope, 𝑏𝑐 represents the sensitivity of the co-op’s price offer to that of IOF. It is 
increasing in 𝛼 as ∂𝑏𝑐/ ∂𝛼 =
𝜁
[2(1−2𝛼)+(1−𝛼)(1−𝛽)𝜁]2
> 0, meaning that the co-op’s price 
decision becomes more sensitive to change in price offer made by the IOF counterpart as the 
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importance of the producer’s cash payment weighs more in the co-op’s objective. However 
𝑏𝑐(0, 𝛼) does not vary with 𝛼, meaning that the slope of the best price-response function of a risk 
neutral co-op is not affected by the objective-weighing parameter 𝛼. On the other hand, the co-op 
will also be more responsive to the IOF’s price offer if 𝛼 < 1/2 as ∂𝑏𝑐/ ∂𝜁 =
(1−𝛼)(1−2𝛼)
[2(1−2𝛼)+(1−𝛼)(1−𝛽)𝜁]2
. 4 Thus, we can establish the following trajectory of the slope of the co-
op’s BR as the co-op changes from being a risk-neutral profit maximizer to a risk-averse 
integrated firm: 
(12) 𝑏𝑐(0,0) = 𝑏𝑐(0, 𝛼) ≤ 𝑏𝑐(𝜁, 0) ≤ 𝑏𝑐(𝜁, 𝛼). 
that is, caring about producer’s cash payment reinforces the positive impact of co-op’s risk 
aversion on how it responds to IOF’s price.  
The intercept 𝑎𝑐 measures the co-op’s propensity to pay for the farmer’s crop. It 
is increasing in 𝛼, ∂𝑎𝑐/ ∂𝛼 =
(𝑝−𝑐)(2−𝛽𝜁)
[2(1−2𝛼)+(1−𝛼)(1−𝛽)𝜁]2
> 0, as the co-op would pay more 
for the farmer’s crop in cash when it integrates the farmer’s cash payment into its 
objective. To the contrary, the effect of risk aversion on the co -op’s propensity to 
pay is less negat ive as ∂𝑎𝑐 ∂𝜁⁄ =
−(𝑝−𝑐)(1−𝛼−𝛼𝛽)
[2(1−2𝛼)+(1−𝛼)(1−𝛽)𝜁]2
< 0, as 𝛼 < 1/2. The risk aversion 
will render smaller propensity to pay for the crop as the co-op needs to be compensated by a 
higher margin, i.e. lower input cost, compared to the risk neutral co-op, for the risk 
associated with its output price. So this lead to the following trajectory of the intercept of co-
op’s BR:  
                                                             
 
4 In the following section, we show that 𝛼 < 1/2 is the necessary condition for interior solution.  
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(13)  𝑎𝑐(𝜁, 0) ≤ 𝑎𝑐(0, 0) ≤ 𝑎𝑐(0, 𝛼). 
While the value of 𝑎𝑐(𝜁, 𝛼) is less clear in comparison to 𝑎𝑐(0, 0), because the effects of 
altruism and risk aversion are pulling the co-op’s propensity to pay for the crop in the opposite 
directions.  
  
Equilibrium  
The equilibrium of this model is characterized by four components: mill prices, firms’ 
expected profit, market shares, and expected utility of the farmer from selling the crop. As 
demonstrated earlier, other equilibrium features will follow the determination of equilibrium 
prices through strategic interaction between the co-op and the IOF. So we will begin with the 
analysis of equilibrium prices, and follow by the discussion of the implications of varying co-op 
objectives on firms’ profit, and market share. We leave the analysis of the producer’s expected 
utility in the simulation given its complex analytic form.   
 The equilibrium price offers (𝑤𝑐
∗∗, 𝑤𝑝
∗∗) obtained by solving the system of equations 
(9) and (11) have the following general form:   
(14)       𝑤𝑐
∗∗ =
𝑎𝑐
1−𝑏𝑝𝑏𝑐
 
                    𝑤𝑝
∗∗ =
𝑏𝑝𝑎𝑐
1−𝑏𝑝𝑏𝑐
  
 And the complete solution is given by:  
(15) 𝑤𝑐
∗∗ =
2{𝛼𝛽+(1−𝛼)[(1−𝛽)𝛽𝜁+(1−2𝛽)]}
(1−𝛽)(3−6𝛼+(1−𝛼)(1−𝛽)𝜁)
(𝑝 − 𝑐) 
                      𝑤𝑝
∗∗ =
1−𝛽
2
𝑤𝑐
∗∗. 
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Substituting 𝑤𝑐
∗∗and 𝑤𝑝
∗∗ into Equation (7) yields the equilibrium market share for a co-op: 
(16) 𝛿∗∗ =
(1−𝛼)−2𝛼𝛽/(1+𝛽)
3(1−2𝛼)+(1−𝛼)(1−𝛽)𝜁
. 
Equilibrium prices offered by both firms as shown above is proportional to the firms’ expected 
marketing margin. For a meaningful interior solution, the equilibrium prices and market shares 
should be both positive and the subsequent expected margins of two firms are non-negative 
(equation 6), i.e. (𝑤𝑐
∗∗, 𝑤𝑝
∗∗)𝜖[0, 𝑝 − 𝑐] and 𝛿∗∗𝜖(0, 1). Mathematically, this means the ratio of 
co-op’s price offer to the expected profit margin is between zero and one, which leads to the 
following regularity conditions among parameters: 
(17)           0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1 −
3−𝛽
4+(1−𝛽2)𝜁
,  
(18)         (1 − 𝛼)[(𝛽 − 1)𝛽𝜁 + (1 − 2𝛽)] + 𝛼𝛽 > 0.   
Inequality (17) restricts a range of values for the level of the co-op’s altruism to the producer that 
can support an interior solution. This is a narrower range for 𝛼 than the concavity condition in 
expression 10, as the upper limit of 𝛼  is no greater than ½. This suggests that co-op cannot 
overweigh the cash price paid to producers against its own profitability under all values of  𝛽 and  
𝜁. As shown in (11), 𝛼 < 1/2 is a sufficient condition for the slope of the co-op’s BR to be 
positive. So the pricing strategies of two firms will always be complements to each other, i.e. as 
the price offer by co-op goes up, the IOF will also offer a higher price and vice versa. A direct 
implication of (14) is that co-op will pay a higher price for grain at equilibrium regardless of its 
objective, because 𝑏𝑝 =
1−𝛽
2
< 1. This means the co-op is less profitable, measured by the profit 
margin, (𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝑤), due to higher input cost. The intuition is that the producer demands risk 
premium for the uncertainty associated with his patronage refund. The relationship between the 
co-op’s objectives and the determination of the market equilibrium prices is illustrated in figure 
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2. Moreover, it is straightforward to show that under (17) and (18), we have 𝑏𝑐𝑏𝑝<1, meaning 
that the equilibrium solution is stronger than a Nash equilibrium that it survives the iterated 
elimination of dominated strategies, and a game as such needs not to expand to a repeated game. 
See appendix B. for proof.  
 
Figure 2. The best response functions and equilibrium prices 
 
Comparative statics 
In this section, we analyze the effects of risk aversion and altruism of the co-op on 
equilibrium prices and firms’ market shares. Because of strategic complementarity of firms’ 
pricing and symmetry in their market shares, we will only show the analysis on the co-op.  
Proposition 1. A relative increase of co-op’s risk aversion to the producer reduces the price 
offers but increases the expected profit margin for both firms in the equilibrium.  
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The Proof is straightforward to show by taking the partial derivative of equilibrium price offer of 
the co-op with respect to the relative risk aversion coefficient: 
(19) 
𝜕𝑤𝑐
∗∗
𝜕𝜁
=
2(𝑝−𝑐)(1−𝛼)((𝛼−1)(1+𝛽)+2𝛼𝛽)
(3−6𝛼+(1−𝛼)(1−𝛽)𝜁)2
< 0 . 
If (𝛼 − 1)(1 + 𝛽) + 2𝛼𝛽 < 0, or 𝛼 < (1 + 𝛽)/(1 + 3𝛽), that is the co-op is not too altruistic 
towards the member-producer, there is negative relationship between equilibrium price levels and 
co-op risk aversion relative to the producer. This is true under the regularity condition (17) which 
implies that 𝛼 < 1/2, because (1 + 𝛽)/(1+ 3𝛽) is great than 1/2 for 𝛽 between zero and one. 
So we can sign 
𝜕𝑤𝑐
∗∗
𝜕𝜁
 as negative. Trivially, the IOF’s price offer will also be lower as the co-op 
becomes more risk averse because the price offers are strategical compliments. Due to the 
inverse relationship between the firms’ expected profit margin and input cost, lower cost of grain 
leads to higher expected margins at the equilibrium. A direct corollary of the proposition 1, 
relating to the implication of co-op’s risk attitude on the firms’ market share is summarized 
below: 
Corollary 1. A relative increase of co-op’s risk aversion to the producer reduces the co-op’s 
market share. 
Because of symmetry, the IOF’s market share therefore will increase. There are two ways to 
prove the corollary 1. Mathematically, the partial derivative of the co-op’s equilibrium market 
share with respect to the relative risk aversion coefficient is given by: 
(20) 
∂𝛿∗∗
∂𝜁
=
(1−𝛼)(1−𝛽)(−1+𝛼−𝛽+3𝛼𝛽)
(1+𝛽)(3−6𝛼+(−1+𝛼)(−1+𝛽)𝜁)2
< 0. 
This result can also be seen from the producer’s allocation function in equation (7), as  
∂𝛿∗
∂𝑤𝑐
=
1−𝛽
𝜌𝛽2𝜎2
> 0. As mentioned earlier, if the patronage refund kept at the co-op is not expected to 
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generate any return, the producer will prefer the cash now than later. But for a co-op that 
operates independently, it may also have the need for keeping the patronage refund, to 
compensate for the risk it is taking. The risk attitude analysis bears policy implications on the 
risk management of the co-op. In this article, risk refers to the exogenous volatility of the output 
price. However, nonsystematic risk may be diversified, and many shocks can be insured by 
participating the derivatives markets. Therefore, the degree of risk aversion is related to the 
extent to which the business risk can be hedged. If less risk aversion induces more desirable 
allocations for both the producers and the organization, managers who operate the co-op may 
pay more attention to the identification and hedging of the business risk.  
Proposition 2. An increase in the co-op’s altruism towards the producer will lead to increase in 
the equilibrium price offers by both firms, but decrease in the firms’ profit margin.   
Proposition 2 addresses the market equilibrium where the co-op takes into account the producer’s 
cash payment. The proof is straightforward: 
(21) 
𝜕𝑤𝑐
∗∗
𝜕𝛼
=
2(𝑝−𝑐)(3−2𝛽𝜁)
(3−6𝛼+(−1+𝛼)(−1+𝛽)𝜁)2
> 0. 
 Intuitively, if co-op incorporates the producer’s payment into its objective, it will pay a higher 
price for the producer’s grain. Following the same logic of corollary 1, the effect of co-op’s 
altruism on the equilibrium market shares is given by  
(22)      
∂𝛿∗∗
∂𝛼
=
(1−𝛽)(3−2𝛽𝜁)
[3(1−2𝛼)+(1−𝛼)(1−𝛽)𝜁]2(1+𝛽)
> 0. 
We summarize this result in the following corollary:  
Corollary 2. An increase in the co-op’s altruism towards the producer will lead to increase in 
the co-op’s market share. 
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The above results show that an increase in grain price offer by the co-op is always favorable to the 
producer as they would allocate more grain to the co-op. This is because the IOF will also have to 
up its bid, but by less amount. The impact of co-op’s objective changes on equilibrium prices can 
also be understood in terms of figure 2. According to (12) and (13), the propensity to pay by the 
co-op is increasing in the level of altruism, and the sensitivity of response to the IOF’s price offer 
is non-decreasing in 𝛼. This means that for a higher 𝛼 and given 𝜁 the BR of the co-op will have 
a larger intercept and slope, both leading to a higher equilibrium price. On the other hand, the 
increasing co-op’s relative risk aversion to the producer has been shown to lead higher response 
sensitivity to the IOF’s offer, but less propensity to pay. However, (20) shows that the effect of 
propensity to pay dominates.    
The unique characteristic of this game is that the symmetry of firms’ objectives do not 
lead to symmetric equilibrium outcomes regarding price offers and market share. In particular, 
even when the co-op has the same objective as the IOF, it still follows the general model outcome 
that the co-op will pay a higher price but obtain a smaller market share. But in this case where co-op 
is a risk-neutral profit maximizer, its market share is 𝛿∗∗(𝜁 = 0, 𝛼 = 0) = 1/3, unaffected by the 
producer’s preference.  
 We show that the only way for the co-op to increase market share is by incorporating the 
producer’s on-farm profit into its own objective. And the highest possible market share for the co-
op is achieved at its maximum level of altruism, i.e. 𝛼𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1 −
3−𝛽
4−(1−𝛽2)𝜁
: 
𝛿𝑚𝑎𝑥
∗∗ (𝛼𝑚𝑎𝑥) =
1
2
. 
So it is feasible for the co-op with dual nature to achieve a higher market share than the co-op just 
maximizing profit. However, it’s practically difficult to split the market evenly with the IOF which 
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reconstitute the standard prediction from a duopsony model, because in such case the co-op has to 
operate at average cost (break-even), i.e. 𝑤𝑐
∗∗(𝜁, 𝛼 = 𝛼𝑚𝑎𝑥) = 𝑝 − 𝑐.  
 
Simulation  
Numerical simulation is aimed to shed lights on the general relationship of the 
cooperative’s objective to the producer’s expected utility at equilibrium, whose analytic solutions 
are too complicated. The numerical simulation can also serve to verify our comparative analysis 
in the prior section.  
For simulation, we standardize the expected value of firms’ output price to be 100, and 
the processing cost 80. The producer’s time discount factor is chosen to be 𝛽 = 0.95^20, to 
reflect the long horizon before all patronage refund is distributed back to the producer. We 
evaluate the co-op’s equilibrium price, the co-op’s market shares and the producer’s expected 
utility at many possible co-op objectives that are defined by a pair of { 𝛼, 𝜁}. The IOF’s price 
offer is just a constant fraction of that of the co-op, and the IOF’s market share is one minus the 
market share of the co-op. We choose 50 evenly spaced values of 𝛼 ranging from 0 to 0.5 and 
100 evenly spaced values for 𝜁 range from 0 to 1. The admissible range of values generated by 
simulation for plots are those satisfy the non-negative price offer and non-negative expected 
profit constraints.  
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The figures 3 and 4 show the equilibrium price offer and market share of the co-op as a 
function of the co-op’s objective function respectively. It clearly verifies our comparative statics 
analysis that the both the co-op’s market share and price offer will increase in its level altruism 
towards the producer, but decrease in the relative level of risk aversion. Same can be said for the 
producer’s expected utility as shown in figure 5. That is, the producer will do better if the co-op 
can operate more in favor of the producer’s utility that leads to higher cash payment by both 
firms. Note that the uneven surfaces exhibited in plots when the value of 𝛼 is close to 0.5. This is 
because a) with 𝛽 smaller than 1, 𝛼 will be strictly smaller than 0.5, and b) the admissible value 
of 𝛼 also depends on  𝜁, which at some level will result in some 𝛼′𝑠 not supporting the interior 
solution.  
 
 
Figure 3. The impact of change co-op’s objective on co-op’s equilibrium price offer 
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Figure 4. The impact of change co-op’s objective on co-op’s market share 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The impact of change co-op’s objective on the producer’s expected utility 
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Discussion and Conclusion  
 
In this article, we analyze the implications of co-op’s organizational structure in a 
duopsony market under uncertainty. The model results shed light on an important empirical 
observation that the number and the market share of cooperative businesses have been declining 
in spite of the important role they play in the U.S. farm marketing industry. We find that the 
frictions to a complete vertical integration of the co-op and its members serve as competitive 
disadvantages to the co-op. These frictions echo some of the property rights constraints of 
agricultural cooperatives outlined in Cook’s (1995) seminar paper: portfolio problem, free rider 
problem, horizon problem, influence costs problem and control problem.  
The portfolio problem justifies our analysis of a risk-averse co-op that is usually ignored 
in the literature. In our model, the portfolio problem faced by the member-producer is to allocate 
their crop between the IOF that is "risk-free" and the co-op, which is "risky" for the amount of 
patronage refund is uncertain. In reality, the members of a co-op may hold a suboptimal portfolio 
due to the illiquidity of their equity, which then results in the mismatch of the co-op risk attitude 
and that of members. We model explicitly how the co-op’s risk aversion relative to the 
producer’s affect the producer’s allocation decisions and equilibrium pricing outcomes.  
With an open membership, our model takes into account an aspect of free rider problem 
pertaining to the cooperative business model, in which members have no commitment to patronize 
the co-op but rather to take advantage of its competitive yardstick role. We show when the 
member-producer do not treat the patronage refund the same as the cash payment, he will send 
more of his crop to the IOF, and co-op in turn will have a smaller market share at the equilibrium.      
The horizon problem will further cause the member-producer to discount the patronage 
refund, which is paid out in the future because older members do not expect to fully benefit from the 
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co-op investment with his money. Li et al. (2015) show that the grain marketing co-ops in Iowa 
carry significantly less long-term debt than IOFs in the same industry. This indicates that co-ops 
may rely on equity financing for long-lived assets, which compounding with the horizon problem 
may adversely affect the longevity and growth of co-ops. We do not model the co-op’s investment 
decisions, but the producer’s preference of uncertain patronage refund is likely to be captured by his 
time value and risk attitude. 
As for to the agency problems, the heterogeneity among member-producers may cause 
damaging influence in determining the co-op’s policy (influence cost problem); on the other 
hand, the co-op may diverge from the interests of members (control problem). Our model 
captures the control problem through the weighting parameter in the co-op’s objective function. 
Conditional on the producer’s preference of cash payment over patronage, the co-op is getting 
bigger market share as it focuses more on the producer’s on-farm profit. However, if the co-op 
behaves like the profit-maximizing IOF, its market share will no longer be affected by its pricing 
policy. This empirical prediction may warrant further investigation as co-ops have grown in size 
and complexity, which furthers the control problem (Staatz, 1987). Our model framework 
assumes a representative producer and the objective weighting of the co-op is exogenous, thus 
not accounting the influence cost problem. Studying the impact of heterogeneous members on 
the co-op’s optimal weighting factor and subsequent objective is an interesting topic for future 
research. 
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Appendix  
 
 
A. Cooperative as an Entrant   
 
The complete solution to the IOF’s problem, Equation (8), subject to non-negative profitability 
constraint is: 
 
Case 1 if (1 − 𝛽)(𝑝 − 𝑐) > 𝜌𝛽2𝜎2,  
 
 
𝑤𝑝
∗ = {
𝛽(𝑝 − 𝑐) + (1 − 𝛽)𝑤𝑐 0 ≤ 𝑤𝑐 < 𝑤𝑐
𝑎𝑝 + 𝑏𝑝𝑤𝑐 𝑤𝑐 ≤ 𝑤𝑐 ≤ 𝑝 − 𝑐
 
 
 
Case 2 if (1 − 𝛽)(𝑝 − 𝑐) ≤ 𝜌𝛽2𝜎2 ≤ (1 + 𝛽)(𝑝 − 𝑐) 
 
 
𝑤𝑝
∗ = 𝑎𝑝 + 𝑏𝑝𝑤𝑐 , ∀𝑤𝑐 ∈ [0, 𝑝 − 𝑐]. 
 
 
Case 3, if 𝜌𝛽2𝜎2 > (1 + 𝛽)(𝑝 − 𝑐), 
 
 
𝑤𝑝
∗ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝑎𝑝 + 𝑏𝑝𝑤𝑐 , 0],∀𝑤𝑐 ∈ [0,𝑝 − 𝑐]. 
 
Considering the IOF as the only game in town before the establishment of a co-op, the corner 
solution of our model facilitates comparison of markets with and without the co-op, and is 
analogous to the idea of entry deterrence in the endogenous market structure (EMS) literature 
(e.g. Etro, 2007; Hueth and Moschini, 2014). The magnitude of the expected marketing margin, 
𝑝 − 𝑐, determines whether the IOF will play to deter the entry  of the co-op. When the marketing 
margin is above the threshold 𝜌𝛽2𝜎2/(1 − 𝛽) (case 1), the IOF will find it optimal to obtain the 
entire market as a monopolist when the co-op’s price offer is below 𝑤𝑐. However, the IOF still 
faces entry threats by the formation of a producer’s co-op. The term 𝛽(𝑝 − 𝑐) + (1 − 𝛽)𝑤𝑐 
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captures how the IOF reacts to entry threats by the co-op, which would be the so called entry 
deterrence price. The producers’ endowment value will be improved by that amount 
consequently. As the marketing margin decreases, it’s no longer optimal for the IOF to be the 
monopolist but rather accept the entry by the co-op as described in case 2 and 3. The possibly 
excessive entry by other IOFs can be limited by imposing a large entry cost, which we do not 
consider in this article as it has been discussed intensively in the I.O. literature (e.g. Mankiw and 
Whinston, 1986; Hueth and Moschini, 2014).  
 
 
B.  Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies  
 
Let the two best responses be 
𝑤𝑝
∗ = 𝑎𝑝 + 𝑏𝑝𝑤𝑐 , ∀𝑤𝑐 ∈ [0,𝑝 − 𝑐],
𝑤𝑐
∗ = 𝑎𝑐 + 𝑏𝑐𝑤𝑝, ∀𝑤𝑝 ∈ [0,𝑝 − 𝑐].
 
where 𝑏𝑝 > 0, 𝑏𝑐 > 0, 𝑏𝑝𝑏𝑐 < 1. 
Given 𝑤𝑐 ∈ [0, 𝑝 − 𝑐], the IOF’s best response satisfies 𝑤𝑝 ∈ [𝑎𝑝, 𝑎𝑝 + 𝑏𝑝(𝑝 − 𝑐)]. So the first 
round of elimination removes IOF’s strictly dominated pricing strategies in the set [0, 𝑎𝑝) ∪
(𝑎𝑝 + 𝑏𝑝𝑤𝑐 , 𝑝 − 𝑐]. 
Given 𝑤𝑝 ∈ [𝑎𝑝, 𝑎𝑝 + 𝑏𝑝(𝑝 − 𝑐)], the co-op’s best response must be in the interval 𝑤𝑐 ∈ [𝑎𝑐 +
𝑏𝑐𝑎𝑝, 𝑎𝑐 + 𝑏𝑐𝑎𝑝 + 𝑏𝑐𝑏𝑝(𝑝 − 𝑐)]. So the co-op’s pricing strategies outside that interval are 
eliminated in the second round of elimination. 
Given 𝑤𝑐 ∈ [𝑎𝑐 + 𝑏𝑐𝑎𝑝, 𝑎𝑐 + 𝑏𝑐𝑎𝑝 + 𝑏𝑐𝑏𝑝(𝑝 − 𝑐)], the IOF’s best response satisfies 𝑤𝑝 ∈ [𝑎𝑝 +
𝑏𝑝𝑎𝑐 + 𝑏𝑝𝑏𝑐𝑎𝑝, 𝑎𝑝 + 𝑏𝑝𝑎𝑐 + 𝑏𝑝𝑏𝑐𝑎𝑝 + 𝑏𝑝𝑏𝑐𝑏𝑝(𝑝 − 𝑐)]. This further eliminates IOF’s 
dominated strategies outside the best response interval. 
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As the iterations continue, the band width of the two bounds of the survived 𝑤𝑝 (and  𝑤𝑐 
similarly) takes the form (𝑏𝑝𝑏𝑐)
(𝑛−1)/2𝑏𝑝(𝑝 − 𝑐), where 𝑛 is the number of iterations. Since 
𝑏𝑝𝑏𝑐 < 1, we have (𝑏𝑝𝑏𝑐)
𝑛−1
2 𝑏𝑝(𝑝 − 𝑐) → 0 as 𝑛 → ∞. 
Thus the bounded 𝑤𝑝 converges to a single point: 
𝑎𝑝∑ (𝑏𝑝𝑏𝑐)
𝑛−1∞
𝑛=1
+ 𝑏𝑝𝑎𝑐∑ (𝑏𝑝𝑏𝑐)
𝑛−1∞
𝑛=1
=
1
1−𝑏𝑝𝑏𝑐
𝑎𝑝 +
1
1−𝑏𝑝𝑏𝑐
𝑏𝑝𝑎𝑐. 
Similarly, 𝑤𝑐 also converges to 
𝑎𝑐∑ (𝑏𝑝𝑏𝑐)
𝑛−1
+ 𝑏𝑐𝑎𝑝
∞
𝑛=1
∑ (𝑏𝑝𝑏𝑐)
𝑛−1∞
𝑛=1
=
1
1−𝑏𝑝𝑏𝑐
𝑎𝑐 +
1
1−𝑏𝑝𝑏𝑐
𝑏𝑐𝑎𝑝. 
This is the unique strategy profile that survives the iterated elimination of dominated strategies. 
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CHAPTER 3 
REFERENCE-DEPENDENCE HEDGING: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM IOWA CORN 
PRODUCERS 
 
Abstract  
 
We examine the role of reference-dependence in the optimal hedging theory under the 
expected utility framework. Our theory characterizes the ways in which producers’ optimal 
hedging differ with or without reference. We test our theoretical predictions with a unique 
database consisting of every forward contract written by a major cooperative over a five-year 
period to Iowa corn producers. Analysis of these data suggests that hedging activity is triggered 
when the current December futures price is higher than a reference price. A likely candidate for 
the reference price is a rolling average of the current futures price. Trading activity implied by 
the Iowa corn producers are then used to determine if producers benefit from the way they 
hedge. The evidence is mixed. The Iowa data is then compared to the only publically available 
data on producer hedging: The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Disaggregated 
Commitment of Traders Report (DCOT) for Short Hedgers. The hedge ratio constructed from the 
open interests in new futures contracts of the DCOT report is highly correlated with the producer 
hedge series in the Iowa data, indicating that DCOT data represents the actual farmers’ hedging 
behavior reasonably well. This has important implications for future research that continues to 
use the DCOT report.   
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Introduction 
Agricultural economists often find limited relevance of Expected Utility (EU) optimal 
hedging theory to real-world marketing decisions, and there is no consensus on how useful other 
utility theory paradigms are as they apply to hedging. One reason for these different views is the 
lack of empirical evidence on what motivates producers’ hedging decisions. The only prior data 
on the use of pre-harvest hedges by crop growers has been survey based, and this literature 
shows widely different participation rates.1 However, there is great benefit to understanding 
actual hedging behavior of grain producers. First, it contributes to an understanding of why 
empirical observation does not corroborate EU theoretical prediction. Second, the impact of 
producers’ hedging practices on the stability of farm income is a crucial issue to both farmers 
and extension economists. Mechanical rules of hedging have been proposed under the perception 
that farmers may be worse off due to their behavioral bias in hedging. An empirical comparison 
of the actual average prices received by producers sheds light on the need for alternative hedging 
strategies. Third, the commercial hedgers (elevators) that provide forward contracting services 
will benefit from an understanding of how and when producers will hedge. 
 The goal of this paper is to investigate the effect on optimal hedging of introducing 
reference-dependence into a traditional EU framework. Reference-dependence is a central 
feature of most alternative utility theory paradigms to EU, positing that agent’s utility is derived 
from the relative gain and loss to his reference rather than his final wealth. Despite the recent 
effort of analyzing hedging under the alternative frameworks, the role of reference-dependence is 
not understood in ways that provide clear empirical guidance that can be used to test against the 
EU optimal hedging.   
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In this paper, we first develop a simple theoretical model that facilitates the comparison 
of optimal hedging with and without reference. We then empirically investigate the motivation of 
producers’ hedging utilizing a unique data set that consists of every forward contract written by a 
major grain cooperative for the period of January 2009 through August 2013. The theoretical 
model offers the null hypotheses that allows us to test whether the forward hedging behavior 
exhibited in the data violates the EU optimal hedging rules. If the EU optimal hedging is violated 
in the data, we identify the role of reference-dependence in producers’ hedging decisions. 
Trading activity implied by producers’ hedging patterns are also examined to determine if 
producers benefit from the way they hedge. Finally, we compare the actual hedging data against 
the Disaggregated Commitment of Traders Report (DCOT) provided by the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC). 
 
Previous Work on Hedging  
 
Under EU optimal hedging, the primary motive for producers’ hedging behaviors is risk 
aversion (Johnson 1960; Holthausen 1979; Feder, Just, and Schmitz 1980; Grant 1985; Castelino 
1992; Lapan and Moschini 1994). Without basis risk and production risk, the EU optimal hedge 
ratio is constant and independent of the futures price if producers believe the futures price is 
unbiased. This result is robust to any concave utility function and incorporation of production 
decisions because of the separation theorem (Feder, Just, and Schmitz 1980). Adding basis risk, 
the optimal hedge ratio is less than a full hedge regardless of the farmer’s belief about the 
expected harvest price, which depends on the correlation coefficient between expected spot and 
forward prices. Further incorporating yield risk, Lapan and Moschini (1994) show that under 
mean-variance approach, the optimal hedge ratio is the regression coefficient of random revenue 
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on the futures price. In a dynamic setting, the optimal hedge ratio increases at the inverse of the 
interest rate and time to maturity (Myers and Hanson 1996). To the extent correlation between 
expected spot prices and forward prices vary overtime, the EU optimal hedge ratio can change. 
But McNew and Fackler (1994) show that with the GARCH model there is little variation in the 
case of corn.  
In survey-based studies, Sartwelle et al. (2000) find no evidence that producers’ self-
identified risk attitudes impact their hedging practices, while Goodwin and Schroeder (1994) 
find a negative impact of risk aversion on the use of forward contracts. On the contrary, 
Schroeder et al. (1998) find that both producers and extension economists perceive forward 
contracts as more price-enhancing than risk- reducing and believe in the existence of market 
timing strategies, even though these strategies have little support in the literature (Irwin et al. 
2006). This rising number of empirical anomalies has led to exploration of alternative theoretical 
frameworks (e.g., Collins, Musser, and Mason 1991; Musser, Patrick, and Eckman 1996; Lien 
2001; Mattos, Garcia, and Pennings 2008; Kim, Brorsen, and Anderson 2010). The central 
feature of most alternative utility theories is reference-dependence. This includes prospect theory 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1979), regret theory (Loomes and Sugden 1982) and expected target 
utility (Fishburn 1977). Instead of focusing on the utility of final wealth, reference-dependence 
implies that individuals generate utility from gains and losses measured relative to a reference 
point (Tversky and Kahneman 1992).  
Research studying the role of reference-dependence in hedging suggests the potential for 
a price-based trigger for changes in hedging positions including both the price change from a 
prior period and the price level itself. Brorsen et al. (1995) find that when prices are low, there is 
a lack of interest in forward contracting. What defines a high crop price that would motivate 
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producers to hedge has yet to be identified. Using data from a hedging game, McNew and 
Musser (2002) find hedge ratios respond to changes in the futures price relative to last year’s 
high price. Kim, Brorsen, and Anderson (2010) show that under an expected target utility 
function, the producer will hedge more when prices rise above a targeted profit margin—the 
reference point. The motivation of this theoretical construct comes from the profit margin 
hedging strategy (e.g., Parcell and Pierce 2009) that is often suggested by market advisory 
services and anecdotal evidence that farmers forward sell a greater portion of their crop when 
prices are high. Mattos et al. (2016), in a recent experimental study, show that producers’ 
marketing decisions depend on the difference between the current futures price and the reference, 
which is influenced by the price trend and producers’ expectations.  
      The existence of a reference effect is well documented in other markets. Babcock (2015) 
shows that cumulative prospect theory with insurance premiums as a reference can generate crop 
insurance purchase decisions that are consistent with observed low participation rates, a result 
that is anomalous to expected utility maximization. In a study of the stock market, Grinblatt and 
Keloharju (2001) find reference price effects in stock trading by individual investors, who have a 
higher propensity to sell if a stock rises above its high of the past month. In fact, individual 
investors in general are found to have greater tendency to sell stocks with positive returns than at 
losses (Shefrin and Statman 1985; Odean 1998). This is called the disposition effect and it cannot 
be reconciled with portfolio management or justified by the subsequent portfolio returns. The 
reference effect is also found in the real estate market.  Those who move from expensive cities 
tend to rent more expensive apartments (Simonsohn and Loewenstein 2006), and home sellers 
use the original purchase price as a reference when setting asking prices (Genesove and Mayer 
2001).   
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The role of basis in forward contracting 
 The unique characteristics of agricultural forward contracts, which are the most common 
marketing tools used by farmers in reality, have also been studied in the past literature (Musser, 
Patrick, and Eckman 1996, Garcia and Leuthold 2004). Nelson (1985) discusses in detail the 
differences between the forward and futures contracts. Among these is the fall basis, the 
difference between the December futures price and the local forward prices, which may reflect 
information about the expected harvest (Taylor et al. 2014). The relationship between the basis 
and hedging, however, is less clear because of two opposing forces.2 On the one hand, the basis 
represents the cost of hedging with forward contracts relative to the futures contracts. Thus, a 
narrowing of the basis may cause more hedging with forward contracts. However, Stringer and 
Sanders (2006) show that the corn basis in Illinois is very small, and in some counties may be 
negative. On the other hand, the basis is also co-determined by the level of hedging. A number of 
studies have shown that an increase in volume of forward contracting results in a lower cash 
price, namely a widening of basis (e.g., Elam et al. 1989; Elam 1992; Schreoder et al. 1993). The 
elevator may even be reluctant to provide the forward contracting service during periods of high 
price volatility, because of the difficulty of managing its own futures account due to margin risk 
(Mark et al. 2008). There are a few episodes where surge in hedging was accompanied by the 
widening in fall basis (e.g., the summers of 2010 and 2012).  
 
Theoretical Framework 
Suppose the objective of the corn producer that markets his crop is to maximize the expected 
utility of price received per bushel by determining his optimal hedge ratio, h: 
(1) 𝑚𝑎𝑥ℎ𝐸𝑢(𝑝
𝑠(1 − ℎ) + 𝑝𝑓ℎ), 
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where 𝑝𝑠 is the harvest price that takes one of two possible values in relation to the futures price 
𝑝𝑓:  
(2) 𝑝𝑠 = {
𝑝𝑓 + 𝜖,            with probablity π  
 𝑝𝑓 − 𝜖,       with probablity 1 − π
.    
The realized harvest price can be higher or lower than the current December futures price by 0 <
𝜖 < 𝑝𝑓 , with probability 0 < π < 1 and 1 − π respectively. π represents the subjective belief of 
the producer about the likelihood of the price going higher. If π = 1/2, then the producer 
believes the futures price is unbiased. While this may seem unrealistic, the binomial model 
technique imposes no more distributional assumptions than a continuous price distribution.  
Denote 𝑅 ≡ 𝑝𝑠(1 − ℎ) + 𝑝𝑓ℎ as the final revenue per bushel received by the producer, 
and we consider the following utility function to study the impact of introducing reference 
dependence in EU on the producer’s optimal hedging decision, 
(3)  𝑢(ℎ; 𝑏, 𝛼, 𝜖, 𝑝𝑓) = { 
 [𝑅 − 𝑏]1−𝛼/1 − 𝛼          ∀ 𝑅 ≥ 𝑏 ≥ 0
−[𝑏 − 𝑅]1−𝛼/1 − 𝛼        ∀ 0 < 𝑅 < 𝑏
. 
When 𝑏, the reference price, is greater than zero, the producer’s utility is derived from the 
relative gain or loss. When 𝑏 = 0, utility function is a power utility function with a constant 
relative risk aversion 0 < 𝛼 < 1. So the reference-dependent producer exhibits risk-aversion in 
gains but risk-seeking in losses. 
The producer’s hedge ratio ℎ is assumed to be bounded, with lower bound 0 and upper 
bound 1 +
|𝑝𝑓−𝑏|
𝜖
. A typical grain producer is unlikely to enter into a long futures or forward 
contract that will add to his existing long position. However, this lower limit does not prevent the 
producer from speculating, as he can choose to not fully hedge, or hedge slightly more than his 
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own harvest. The upper limit of the hedge ratio is to ensure that a reference-dependent 
producer’s utility function, equation 3, is meaningful for all possible value of the hedge ratio. 
 The deviation of the futures price from the producer’s reference is also assumed to be not 
too big, such that |𝑝𝑓 − 𝑏| < 𝜖. This assumption keeps the reference-dependent producer’s 
objective function from degenerating to a globally concave function that will neglect the role of 
reference.  
Proposition 1. If the producer believes the futures price is unbiased, his optimal hedge 
ratio is:  
(4) ℎ∗ = { 
1          ∀  𝑝𝑓 > 𝑏 ≥ 0
0          ∀ 0 < 𝑝𝑓 < 𝑏
[0,1]               𝑝𝑓 = 𝑏
. .     
Proof: See appendix.  
Equation 4 illustrates that for a reference independent producer that believes the futures is 
unbiased, his optimal hedging decision is to fully hedge. While for the producer that derives 
utility from the revenue level relative to his reference, he will only hedge when the futures price 
is higher than his reference. In other words, reference dependence causes the hedging decision to 
respond to the level of the futures price; whereas the EU optimal hedge ratio is a constant.  
This simple model does not capture explicitly the dynamics of producers’ hedging during 
the pre-harvest season. In practice, the producer is unlikely to price all his crop early in the 
season, but instead increases the hedge gradually with the approach of harvest and uncertainty 
dissipating. If the producer’s utility does not depend on reference, we shall not observe much 
hedge ratio variation year-to-year nonetheless.  
However, for a reference-dependent producer, there are two possible empirical 
implications of his hedging pattern from proposition 1: 
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(i) The percentage of total crop sold forward by producers before harvest will change from year 
to year.  
(ii) The producer who gradually markets his crop would hedge more during times when the 
futures price is higher than their reference, while hedge little at the futures price below their 
reference. 
   The producer may change his hedging decision if he believes that the futures price is 
biased. A trivial extension of proposition 1 is when the futures price is equal to reference: if the 
producer believes the futures price is more likely to go down (up), he will (not hedge) fully 
hedge because the marginal expected utility of hedging is always positive (negative). The 
comparative statics analysis is not applicable in this special case because the initial optimal 
hedge ratio can take any value between zero and one.  
  It is also a salient observation in the literature that producers tend to hedge more as the 
futures price increases. The EU can explain the change in producer’s hedging decisions to the 
extent that he believes the futures price is biased. For example, if the futures price increases 
while the producer’s belief about the harvest price stays the same, then he may increase his short 
position as he speculates the futures price will fall in the future. However, this price-induced 
hedging response may differ with and without reference, as summarized in the following 
proposition:  
Proposition 2. If producers believe the futures price is biased, then the marginal impact of his 
belief about the probability of the futures price going up in the second period is: 
(5) 𝜕ℎ
∗
𝜕π⁄ =
{
 
 
−2𝑝𝑓/[𝑔1(𝜋)𝛼𝜖]
−2(𝑝𝑓 − 𝑏)/[𝑔1(𝜋)𝛼𝜖]
−2(𝑏 − 𝑝𝑓)/[𝑔2(𝜋)𝛼𝜖]
0
                   
𝑖𝑓  𝑏 = 0
𝑖𝑓  𝑝𝑓 > 𝑏 > 0
𝑖𝑓 𝑏 > 𝑝𝑓 > 0  &  𝑔3(𝜋) < 𝜖 /(𝑏 − 𝑝
𝑓)
 𝑖𝑓 𝑏 > 𝑝𝑓 > 0  &  𝑔3(𝜋) > 𝜖 /(𝑏 − 𝑝
𝑓)
, 
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where 𝑔1(𝜋) =
[(1−π)π]
1−𝛼
𝛼⁄
[π
1
𝛼⁄ +(1−π)
1
𝛼⁄ ]
2, 𝑔2(𝜋) =
[(1−π)π]
1−𝛼
𝛼⁄
[π
1
𝛼⁄ −(1−π)
1
𝛼⁄ ]
2, 𝑔3(𝜋) =
π1/𝛼+(1−π)1/𝛼
(1−π)1/𝛼−π1/𝛼
.  
Proof: See appendix.  
The first line in equation 5 describes that for a reference-independent farmer who thinks the 
current futures price is too low, he will reduce his optimal hedge ratio from a full hedge. 
Conversely, if the producer thinks the futures price is more likely to go down in the second 
period, he will increase his hedge ratio.  
On the other hand, if the producer is reference-dependent and the futures price is above 
his reference, he will exhibit similar speculative behavior as described in the second line. 
However, as the third and fourth lines of equation 5 illustrate, if the futures price is below the 
reference, then the producer will not hedge unless he believes the probability of the harvest price 
ends up being lower than the current futures price is high enough such that 𝜋 < 𝑔3
−1(
𝜖
𝑏−𝑝𝑓
). Note 
that 𝑔3(𝜋) is continuous and monotonically increasing when 𝜋 ∈ [0, 0.5). In other words, 𝑔3(𝜋) 
is invertible with 𝑔3
−1(. ) denoting its inverse function. The intuition is that in losses as the price 
below reference, the producer is risk-loving, and he will not choose to limit the upside of his 
revenue by hedging in case the good state is realized; unless he is so certain that the futures price 
will go down even more in the next period.   
Also, the marginal effect on the hedge ratio of the producer’s subject probability is 
smaller when the futures price is below the reference as 𝑔2(𝜋) > 𝑔1(𝜋), not to mention when 
𝜋 > 𝑔3
−1(
𝜖
𝑏−𝑝𝑓
), the producer will not hedge even when he believes that the futures price has an 
upward bias. The intuition here is that when the price is below reference, the producer is risk 
loving, and will not choose to limit the upside of revenue by hedging unless he is certain that the 
futures price will go down even more in the next period.   
43 
 
 
 
To bring proposition 2 to data, we rely on a salient observation in the literature regarding 
the price – hedge ratio relationship. Short hedgers’ position of corn as reported in the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) Disaggregated Commitment of Traders 
reports (DCOT) appears to increase as the futures price goes up. However, the economic 
argument behind this observation is not pegged due to several competing hypotheses. For 
example, the positive price - hedge ratio correlation is consistent with the reference-dependent 
hedging theory: as the futures price increases above the producer’s reference, he will hedge to 
lock in the gains. However, the EU optimal hedging without reference can also explain the 
producer’s price response in hedging if the futures price increases while the producer’s belief 
about the harvest price stays the same. Then there will be an increase in the speculative short 
position.  
Resolving the differences among competing hypotheses hinges on whether researchers 
can observe the producers’ beliefs about the future spot price. This is only possible with the 
experimental data. As for the actual trades data, the proposition 2 implies a necessary empirical 
condition for the existence of reference-dependence without assuming the motivation for the 
price-induced hedging:  
(iii) When the reference effect is removed, the response of the hedge ratio to price will be 
symmetric and independent of the level of the futures price. When the reference effect is 
introduced, the hedge ratio will only respond to price changes if the futures price is above 
the reference, this will lead to an asymmetric response.  
  In the empirical section that follows, we do not observe how the producer thinks—
speculation is just one possible explanation as to why the producer’s hedge ratio responds to the 
price change. To the extent producers are reference-dependent, the asymmetric response 
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suggested by the model refers to the decision of whether to adjust hedge ratio, rather than the 
size of hedge ratio change.  
Data  
We analyze the hedging activities of Iowa corn producers using daily forward contract 
data from a major grain marketing cooperative for the period from January 2009 to August 2013.  
This firm has over 30 grain-receiving locations with an average annual total handle of more than 
100 million bushels.  The data include over 115,000 forward contracts for corn and contain the 
contract date, bushels contracted, and delivery date.3 We focus on forward contracting in the pre-
harvest period from January 1 to August 31 as harvest grain bids are commonly available 
between January and the end of August (Mallory et al., 2015).  Restricting our analysis in this 
way separates the decision to hedge anticipated production from storage hedges and post-harvest 
contracts used to lock in favorable prices or basis for planned deliveries.  
The numerator of the hedge ratio at date t is measured as the total number of bushels 
contracted from January to date t for delivery in the period September 1 to August 31 of the 
following year.4 Because expected production is not observable, we use annual grain purchased 
(handled) by the cooperative as a proxy. We make the assumption of producer homogeneity in 
their hedging patterns as the data does not allow identification of individual producers, while the 
farm characteristics only affect the adoption decisions of futures and forward contracts by 
producers but not how they hedge (Katchova and Miranda, 2004).5 
Figure 1 shows that the proportion of corn that is hedged varies considerably from year to 
year. In particular, more than 20% of corn was forward priced in the high price years of 2010–
2012, while only 3.75% was hedged at the same time in 2013, a year when prices fell 
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significantly from 2012 levels.6 This empirical observation is certainly consistent with the 
theoretical prediction of the hedging behavior of a reference-dependent producer. 
  
 
Figure 1. The level of producer’s pre-harvest hedge ratio, 01/2009–08/2013 
 
Empirical Procedure  
The reference-dependent utility theory, as it applies to hedging, predicts that producers’ 
hedging behaviors may exhibit asymmetry depending on the level of the futures prices relative to 
their reference price. Figure 2 plots weekly change in hedge ratios within each crop year, and the 
producers do seem to hedge differently during some periods than others.  
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
1/
6/
09
3/
6/
09
5/
6/
09
7/
6/
09
9/
6/
09
11
/6
/0
9
1/
6/
10
3/
6/
10
5/
6/
10
7/
6/
10
9/
6/
10
11
/6
/1
0
1/
6/
11
3/
6/
11
5/
6/
11
7/
6/
11
9/
6/
11
11
/6
/1
1
1/
6/
12
3/
6/
12
5/
6/
12
7/
6/
12
9/
6/
12
11
/6
/1
2
1/
6/
13
3/
6/
13
5/
6/
13
7/
6/
13
9/
6/
13
11
/6
/1
3
H
ed
ge
 r
at
io
 le
ve
l
Hedge ratio
46 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Weekly change in producer’s pre-harvest hedge ratios, 01/2009–08/2013 
 
We do not observe producers’ reference prices directly, but may infer whether the current 
futures price is above his reference or not based on the observed hedging behavior using the 
Markov Switching regression model (Hamilton 1989). There are two states of producers’ hedging 
decisions: ‘to hedge’ or ‘not to hedge’, and the probability of each hedging state prevails is 
assumed to follow a first-order Markov process. The state of no hedging would correspond to the 
period when the futures price is below the producer’s reference, when a reference-dependent 
producer is reluctant to forward price his crop.  
Our reference-dependence hedging theory prescribes two state-dependent variables, the 
effects of which on hedging vary across states. Let ℎ𝑡 denote the cumulative hedge ratio, the total 
amount of crop forward priced as a percentage of expected harvest up to date t, and then ∆ℎ𝑡 is the 
proportion of total harvest hedged in week t. Proposition 1 implies that if the producer’s utility is 
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reference-dependent, more of the crop would be hedged in weeks when the futures price is above 
the reference: 
(6) ∆ℎ𝑡 = {
𝛼0 ,     𝑝𝑡 ≥ 𝑅𝑡,
 𝛼0 ̃,      𝑝𝑡 < 𝑅𝑡  ,
 
where 𝑝𝑡 is the current futures price and 𝑅𝑡 is the producer’s reference. 𝛼0 and 𝛼0 ̃ is the average 
weekly portion of expected production forward priced during the pre-harvest season, conditional 
on the current futures price being above and below the reference respectively. Thus, the empirical 
objective is to compare the intercepts: whether 𝛼0 is significantly differing from 𝛼0 ̃.  
We are agnostic about the motivation for the potential hedging response to the futures 
price changes by the producer. However, as proposition 2 suggests, if the producer’s utility 
function is reference-dependent, the producer may hedge more as prices increase above the 
reference price.7 However, his hedging is much less responsive to price changes if the level of 
futures price is below reference:    
(7)  ∆ℎ𝑡 = {
𝛽0∆𝑝𝑡,     𝑝𝑡 ≥ 𝑅𝑡  
 𝛽0 ̃∆𝑝𝑡,      𝑝𝑡 < 𝑅𝑡 
, 
where ∆𝑝𝑡  is the weekly difference in the logged price of the December futures contract. To 
simplify the notation, let 𝑠 denote the unobservable state variable. Accounting for the impact of 
time to harvest and price volatility, we write the empirical specification as:   
(8) ∆ℎ𝑡 = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛽1𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠∆𝑝𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡,           𝜀𝑡~𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑠
2). 
Two state-dependent coefficients in equation 8 are intercept 𝛼𝑠  and the responsiveness of hedge 
ratio change to price changes 𝛽𝑠𝑡. We also allow the variance of residuals to differ between states, 
as the hedge ratio may exhibit larger variation in the state in which farmers are actively placing 
hedges. The variable time measures the weeks left until the harvest in October, and producers are 
expected to hedge a greater proportion of new crop as harvest approaches due to resolving 
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uncertainty over yields. Price volatility 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑡, measured as the annualized standard deviation of the 
daily log returns for the December futures contract for each week (Irwin and Sanders 2012), is to 
control for the possibility that producers indeed hedge to reduce minimize their price risks. time 
and 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑡 are control variables and are assumed to be state-independent.  
Denote 𝑷𝒕 the two-by-two matrix that governs the transition of the states of the producer’s 
hedging, and states 1 and 2 correspond to the state of ‘no hedging’ and ‘hedging’ respectively. 
Then the i, jth element of the matrix, 𝑝𝑖𝑗 = Pr(𝑠𝑡 = 𝑗| 𝑠𝑡−1 = 𝑖), represents  the probability of state 
𝑗  realizing in the current period t given the last period’s state i. The transition matrix 𝑷𝒕  is 
unobservable, but we can infer from the producers’ hedging patterns, conditional on the 
explanatory variables specified in equation 8. The null hypotheses of no state-dependent hedging 
patterns are associated with the EU optimal hedging without reference; while evidence of state-
dependent hedging would be consistent with the scenario in which the producer is reference-
dependent. Statistically, if the difference between the state-dependent coefficients estimates are 
significant and the transition matrix of the Markov process is not singular and symmetric, then 
there is an empirical support that switching does occur.  
 
Explore the possible reference price  
To the extent producers’ hedging exhibits state-dependent patterns, the Markov Switching 
regression model may lack the insight regarding what triggers the transition between the states. In 
this section, we modify equation 3 to explore whether the reference-dependent hedging is 
associated with some of the candidate reference prices in the previous literature:  
(9) ∆ℎ𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 1{𝑝𝑡−𝑅𝑡<0} + 𝛽1𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒+  𝛽2𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽3∆𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽4∆𝑝𝑡1{𝑝𝑡−𝑅𝑡<0} + 𝜀𝑡. 
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1{𝑝𝑡−𝑅𝑡<0} is a dummy variable equal to one if the current futures price is below the reference and 
zero otherwise. 𝛼0  estimates the average proportion of the crop hedged per week when the futures 
price is above the reference and 𝛼1 is the estimate of difference between the amount hedged when 
the futures price is above and below the reference price. The interaction term in equation 9 is to 
account for the potential asymmetric response of hedge ratios to price changes as discussed earlier. 
The error term, 𝜀𝑡, is an identically, independently and normally distributed shock, with mean zero 
and variance 𝜎2.   
There are a large number of candidate references. The RMA projected harvest price that 
used to establish revenue guarantees in crop insurance and the estimated production cost per-
bushel are thresholds that producers might use. The insurance price may serve as a lower-bound 
below which a producer has no incentive to enter a forward contract. Similarly, a producer may 
be reluctant to hedge when the futures price is below his production cost because it means they 
will be locking in a loss. Behaviorally, a producer may also refer to the last year’s average 
marketing price when making hedging decisions, or a past 30-day moving average price as a 
reference.8  
The statistical validity of regression 9 hinges on the assumption of normality of the error 
term. We check the validity of this assumption by examining the autocorrelation and variance of 
the realized residuals. To the extent this assumption is violated, the standard errors for estimates 
are calculated with Heteroskedastic-Autoregressive-Consistent (HAC) estimator. If the null 
hypothesis of no reference price effect is rejected, different candidate reference prices are then 
compared using goodness-of-fit. However, it is hardly possible to statistically identify which 
candidate reference price is better if the high and low price periods, defined relative to references, 
overlap. This issue pertains especially to non-dynamic references including production cost and 
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insurance. However, the reference price effect argument can be strengthened if the hedging 
response to prices are asymmetric (i.e., producers sell into price rallies only when the futures price 
is above the reference).  
 
Results 
Table 1 presents quasi-maximum log-likelihood estimation results for equation 8. 
Without loss of generality, we let state 1 be the state where hedging is less active and state 2 
represents the active hedging state. The estimated time-to-harvest effect has the expected 
negative sign and is statistically significant; corn producers, on average, price more of their 
upcoming expected harvest as yield uncertainty diminishes towards harvest. The magnitude of 
the time-to-harvest effect is small however, one week closer to the harvest month leads an 
increase in the weekly hedges by around 0.01 percentage points of the total harvest. The other 
state-independent variable, price volatility in the preceding week, does not have a significant 
impact on the change in hedge ratios.  
 The state-dependent intercept 𝛼𝑠 estimates indicate that the weekly average portion of 
total harvest forward sold by producers in state 1 is 0.4 percentage points, while in state 2 the 
producers on average hedge 1.2 percentage points of their crop per week, three times more than 
in state 1. This clear asymmetry is also found in producers’ hedging response to the futures price 
changes. Producers in state 2 are increasing their hedge by 0.18 percentage points for a one 
percent increase in the futures price, which is sex times greater than in state 1. Finally, the 
hedging pattern in state 2 exhibits higher variance is also as expected, as larger swings in hedge 
ratio changes are hard to capture. In this regard, we perform the Lagrange multiplier tests of 
autocorrelation and autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (Hamilton 1996), which 
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suggest that residuals from the estimation of equation 3 exhibits neither heteroscedasticity nor 
serial correlation.  
 
Table 1. Quasi-Maximum Log-Likelihood Estimation of Parameters and Standard Errors Based 
on Iowa Corn Producers’ Weekly Pre-Harvest Forward Contracting Data, 2009–2013. 
Equation 8: ∆ℎ𝑡 = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛽1𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠∆𝑝𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡   𝜀𝑡~𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑠𝑡
2 ) 
 State 1 State 2  
 State Independent Variables 
Markov Transition 
Probabilities 
𝛽1 -0.0001** 𝑝11 0.95 
 (0.00003) 𝑝12 0.05 
𝛽2 -0.0005 𝑝21 0.25 
 (0.00063) 𝑝22 0.75 
 State Dependent Variables Difference 
𝛽𝑠 0.0349*** 0.1773*** 0.1680*** 
 (0.0070) (0.0514) (0.0010) 
𝛼𝑠  0.0041*** 0.0120*** 0.0078*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0029) (0.0014) 
𝜎𝑠 0.0025*** 0.0099*** 
 
 (0.0004) (0.0015)  
Autocorrelation                                       0.95 
ARCH Effect                                           2.67 
Log-likelihood                                         689 
AIC                                                         -1366 
BIC                                                         -1317 
 
Note. Significance levels indicated as: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors in the 
parentheses. The join-significance of intercepts is examined with Wald test with p-value 
reported. Specification tests (Hamilton 1996) are performed and Lagrange multiplier statistic are 
reported. 5% critical value of F-distribution is 3.84. 
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Figure 3 plots the actual weekly hedge data against the smoothed probability that the producer is 
in the active hedging state (𝑝[𝑠 = 2]) based on the full sample information.  
 
Figure 3. Weekly change in producer hedge ratios vs. the inferred probability that the 
producer was in an active hedging state during each week, 01/2009–08/2013 
 
The producer hedge series exhibits clear shifts between the states of hedging and not 
hedging as the smoothed probabilities, which rarely lie around 50%, offer a strong verdict about 
whether the producer is actively hedging. Consistent with intuition, the active hedging state, state 
2, is associated with the periods where large weekly hedges took place, but the timing of which 
seems not to follow a consistent pattern year-to-year. In particular, the active hedging state can 
prevail close to harvest, as in 2009 and 2012; it can also prevail in early spring as in 2011, or 
does not appear at all during the entire growing season, as in 2013. More insight is gained from 
the estimated Markov transition probabilities, as reported in table 1. The producers have the 
tendency to stay in their current state in the subsequent period. There is a 95% probability state 1 
will be followed by another realization of state 1; and if the producer starts in state 2, there is a 
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75% chance that they continue to actively hedge in the next period. This suggests that the 
producer’s hedging decision is unlikely to be altered, and shifts between the states of hedging 
may be triggered by some economic stimuli, which we explore with regression equation 9.  
Table 2 presents the OLS estimates and model fit statistics for equation 9 and a base case 
regression where no reference price specification is included. Robust standard errors are used as 
the assumption of homoscedasticity of the residuals is rejected for all candidate reference prices 
at 5% significance level. This is in agreement with the result of the Markov Switching regression 
result where the sample variances differ across states. Unlike the Markov Switching where the 
probability of a state prevailing at each period is inferred from the data, regression 4 serves to 
test whether the asymmetry in producers’ hedging occur for a preset candidate reference. For this 
approach, we would ideally like to see the futures price oscillate around the reference price so as 
to generate enough observations in both high price and low price periods. The estimated 
production cost, however, is always below the December futures prices in our sample period. 
This prevents the empirical test of production cost as the reference as the regression will restore 
to base case with no reference.  
Comparison between the reference price specification and the base case shows little 
improvement in model fit when the references are static. When the past 30-day average price is 
used as reference, adjusted R2 is increased from 31% to more than 38%.  
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Table 2. OLS Estimates of Parameters and Robust Standard Errors Based on Iowa Corn   
Producers’ Pre-Harvest Weekly Forward Contracting Data, 2009–2013.  
Equation 9: ∆ℎ𝑡 = 𝛼0 ̃ + 𝛼1 1{𝑝𝑡−𝑅𝑡<0} + 𝛽1𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒+  𝛽2𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽3∆𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽4∆𝑝𝑡1{𝑝𝑡−𝑅𝑡<0} + 𝜀𝑡. 
 
 No reference Last year average 30 day average RMA projected price 
𝛼0 ̃ 0.0068*** 0.0078*** 0.0070*** 0.0078*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0020) 
𝛼1   -0.0020 -0.0024*** -0.0018 
  (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0012) 
𝛽1 -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
𝛽2 0.0019 0.0018 0.0010 0.0018 
 (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0018) 
𝛽3 0.0964*** 0.0915*** 0.1370*** 0.0982*** 
 (0.0241) (0.0225) (0.0411) (0.0291) 
𝛽4  -0.0087 -0.1175*** -0.0203 
  (0.0433) (0.0419) (0.0395) 
𝛼0 ̃ + 𝛼1   0.0058*** 0.0046*** 0.0059*** 
  (<0.0001) (0.0044) (0.0001) 
𝛽3 + 𝛽4  0.0828** 0.0195* 0.0778** 
  (0.0269) (0.0608) (0.0109) 
Adj-R2 0.3109 0.3194 0.3754 0.3182 
DW Test 0.2528 0.2644 0.1917 0.2568 
BP Test 0.0011 0.0004 0.0002 0.0004 
Note. Significance levels indicated as: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors in the 
parentheses. The joint-significance of intercepts is examined with a Wald test with p-value 
reported. Durbin-Watson test and Breusch-Pagan test are performed against autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity respectively, and p-values are reported.  
 
The time-to-maturity effect is still robust and statistically significant across all reference 
prices. No significant impact of price volatility on hedging is found. In the base case, the weekly 
average hedge captured by the intercept estimate is 0.68 percent of the total harvest. A 1 percent 
weekly price increase will lead to an additional hedging of 0.1 percentage point of the crop. The 
estimates in the base case may represent the averaging parameters estimates depicting the 
producer’s hedging pattern above and below the references, if the asymmetry does exist.  
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Parameter 𝛼0 ̃ captures the weekly average hedge when the futures price is above the 
reference. Producers on average hedge 0.78 percent of their total harvest in weeks when the 
futures price is above the previous year average marketing price and the RMA projected harvest 
price. This is greater than the average weekly hedge of 0.7 percent in the base case scenario of no 
reference. However, a threshold response in the hedge ratio as captured by estimate 𝛼1  when the 
current December futures contract price is below the producers’ candidate reference prices is not 
statistically significant for these two static references. Similarly, RMA projected price and last 
year’s price do not seem to cause the asymmetric price response in hedging. The parameter 
estimate 𝛽4 are not significant in these two situations, and estimated 𝛽3 capturing the producer’s 
price response in hedging when the futures price is above reference are similar in magnitude as 
in the base case.   
We do observe different hedging patterns when the futures price fluctuates around a 
dynamic reference price (i.e., the past 30-day average price of the December futures contracts). 
As shown in table 2, the difference in hedging dynamics appears in two ways. First, when the 
futures price is above the price trend, the weekly average hedge is about the same in the base 
case, around 0.7 percentage point of the crop. However, the weekly hedge on average is 
significantly reduced to 0.46 percentage points when the futures price is below trend. The 
difference in hedging response to the price change is also detected. In particular, a 1% increase in 
price when the price is above the past 30-day average results in a 0.14 percentage point increase 
in hedging, this much higher than in the base case. On the other hand, in weeks when the futures 
price is below the 30-day average price, producers barely increase their hedging position, as the 
joint parameter estimates, 𝛼0 ̃ + 𝛼1  and is statistically insignificant from zero at the 5% level.   
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The 30-day average contract price parameter is robust to adding longer-dated price 
changes such as a 60-day, 90-day, and 6-month old moving average. The results are also robust 
to small changes in the number of days used to calculate the moving average. Yearly seasonality 
may also play a role in explaining variations in producers’ hedging behaviors, since the 
uncertainty of harvest may be resolved at different paces in different crop years. We test for such 
seasonality by adding yearly dummies as well as interacting the yearly dummies with the weeks 
to harvest. The joint test cannot reject the null hypothesis of no yearly seasonality in producers’ 
hedging.   
Besides providing more explanatory power than other candidate references, the 
implication from the 30-day average price as reference for producers’ hedging is also consistent 
with the finding of the Markov Switching regression—an asymmetric hedging behavior 
exhibited by the corn producer. Note that if the shifts between the hedging and non-hedging 
states are indeed triggered by the futures price moving across the 30-day average price, then the 
periods when the futures price is above the 30-day average price shall also be accompanied by 
high probabilities of state 2 as inferred from the Markov Switching model. We plot the smoothed 
probability that state 2 prevails in each week in figure 4 alongside the actual weekly hedge data, 
and also the price change from the 30-day average price. The probability is normalized by the 
maximum value of the weekly hedge ratio change to facilitate a visual comparison. Immediately 
apparent is the high correlation between the probability of state 2 and the price change from the 
past 30-day average, which strengthens the evidence of reference-dependent hedging by corn 
producers, with a 30-day moving average of the futures price the likely candidate reference price.  
Finally, figure 5 plots the 30-day moving averages of the December futures and the level of 
producer hedge ratio. It shows that in recent years, producers’ hedge ratio was increasing at a 
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much faster pace when the futures price is trending up rather than down, leading the producer to 
hedge a greater portion of their harvest at the end of the pre-harvest season.   
 
Figure 4. Weekly change in producer hedge ratios vs. percent price changes for December 
futures from its past 30-day moving average, 01/2009–08/2013 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Producer hedge ratios vs. the 30-day moving average of December futures, 01/2009–
08/2013 
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Do the observed hedging patterns result in a higher price? 
The previous results suggest that hedging behavior is related to price changes, which in 
turn suggests that hedging might be driven in part by an attempt to time the market. This raises 
the question as to whether this trading pattern is better than selling a fixed portion of the 
expected crop each month or all of their crop at harvest or at planting. The October and January 
average price of the December futures contract is used to approximate the harvest price and 
planting price respectively. If the producers’ hedging patterns result in a superior performance to 
the common alternative hedging strategies, the reference-price effect argument may be weakened 
as the EU hedging does permit the possibility of producers speculating with private information.  
 To facilitate the analysis, we ignore the transaction cost and basis risk, and assume that 
the producers adjust their hedge ratio weekly. We calculate the weighted average price per 
bushel received on the hedged crop P, using actual pre-harvest hedging. The weights correspond 
to the volume sold at the end of each week t  as a percentage of the total harvest, namely weekly 
change in hedge ratio ∆ℎ𝑡, normalized by the level of hedge ratio the end of pre-harvest season 
T, ℎ𝑇,: 
(10) 𝑃 = ∑ (∆ℎ𝑡 ∗ 𝑝𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 )/ℎ𝑇, 
Table 3 shows the average prices per bushel sold using the producer hedge series, the 
futures price at harvest, the futures price at planting, and the average price of December futures 
contracts during the pre-harvest period. With only five years of data it is not advisable to use 
these results to draw strong conclusions. However, we can say that during this five-year period 
both farm-level hedgers obtained a better price than the strategy of selling equal amounts every 
month before harvest and the strategy of selling all of their expected production in January or 
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March. The dominant strategy during this somewhat unusual period was to wait until harvest to 
sell grain. This is due to large increases in corn prices during 2010 and 2012.   
Table 3. Average Price Received by Producers before Harvest, in Cents. 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 5-year average 
Sell equal amount monthly 402 395 642 609 538 517 
Price at harvest 371 546 632 750 439 548 
Price in January 435 413 569 567 585 514 
Price in March 411 397 598 559 558 505 
Price received by farm level hedger 415 400 657 680 549 540 
 
Comparison to the DCOT new crop hedging data  
The DCOT report has been criticized for the limitation in accurately classifying traders’ 
activities (CFTC 2006a), as it aggregates across all futures contracts, and thus the DCOT report 
will include storage hedges as well as spread trades. However, CFTC also separates the open 
interest into new and old futures in the DCOT report. The new futures open interest corresponds 
to the contracts maturing in the first contract of the next marketing year and later, which 
presumably contains information about producers’ pre-harvest hedging. We construct the 
commercial pre-harvest hedge ratio in a similar fashion as the producer hedge ratio, which is 
calculated as the ratio of the weekly short hedgers open positions in new futures contracts over 
the USDA’s final number of total U.S. corn harvest. Figure 6 plots the level of both producer and 
commercial hedge ratios during the pre-harvest period. It is immediately apparent that the two 
series are highly correlated, indicating the CFTC DCOT short hedgers’ position in new futures 
represents the actual producers’ hedging reasonably well. This makes sense as corn producers 
can hedge their expected crop either by taking a short position in the futures markets or by 
forward contracting with a local grain dealer or warehouse that in turn hedges this exposure on 
futures markets. 
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Figure 6. The level of hedge ratios, commercial vs. producer, 01/2009–08/2013
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The DCOT data may be published with a lag. Grain elevators may accumulate forward 
contracts and lay off the risk in futures markets on a sporadic basis.  There also might be lag in 
the reporting process from futures participants to the CFTC. This seems to be the case for corn. 
The weekly producer hedge ratio constructed according to the release dates of the DCOT reports 
leads the change in commercial hedge ratios as shown in figure 7. A hedge ratio constructed 
using three trading-days prior to the release date of the DCOT report, as plotted in figure 8, 
shows a noticeable degree of improvement in terms of the matching of the two series.  
 
Figure 7. Weekly change in pre-harvest hedge ratios, commercial vs. producer series 
with matching date, 01/2009–08/2013 
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Figure 8. Weekly change in pre-harvest hedge ratios, commercial vs. producer series 
lagged by three trading-day, 01/2009–08/2013 
 
 Summary and Conclusions  
This paper explores the role of reference-dependence in producer’s optimal hedging. We 
develop a theoretical framework that highlights the empirical implications that would violate EU 
optimal hedging, but are consistent with the hedging behavior of a reference-dependent producer. 
Empirically, we analyze a dataset of every forward contract for more than 30 locations over a 
five-year period. We compute a producer hedge ratio by comparing the proportion of corn that 
was forward contracted to the total amount delivered in that year to those elevators. The data 
show that in the period from 2010 to 2012, when prices trended up, as much as 24% of the crop 
was forward contracted. In 2013, when prices trended down only 4% was forward contracted.   
      This paper demonstrates that the asymmetric behavior in the Iowa corn producers’ 
hedging is clearly present. Hedgers respond to price changes, and in particular they sell more 
when the current futures price is above the monthly average. The tendency of hedgers to sell into 
a price rally, will in the short run, help to stabilize futures prices. However, the tendency to sell 
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more corn in drought years may exacerbate harvest time price volatility because a smaller 
proportion of the crop will be uncommitted at the end of the season.  The reduction in hedging 
behavior in years when prices trend down is problematic from a risk management perspective. 
These are the years when hedging is needed to stabilize revenues. We also examine whether this 
price-induced hedging activity results in higher prices than less active hedging strategies. The 
evidence is mixed, in part because the database is too short to make a statistically valid 
conclusion. This is something that can be addressed for a range of commodities now that it has 
been shown that the DCOT data in agricultural commodities reflect actual producer behavior.       
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Appendix  
Proof of Proposition 1.  
The producer believes the futures is unbiased with equal probabilities of higher or lower (i.e., 
𝜋 = 1/2) prices. If the producer is reference-independent, they will maximize the objective 
function with respect to the hedge ratio  
𝑚𝑎𝑥ℎ𝐸𝑅
1−𝛼/1 − 𝛼,  
and the optimal hedge ratio ℎ∗ is given by the following: 
I. (1 − ℎ∗)𝜖 = 0, 
which suggests that under the unbiased futures price, the producer will fully hedge their crop 
regardless of the level of the futures price (i.e., ℎ∗ = 1). 
To solve the optimal hedging of a reference-dependent producer, three cases need to be 
considered. 
Case 1. The futures price is above reference: 𝑝𝑓 > 𝑏 and the producer believes the futures price 
is unbiased, π = 1/2.  
In this case, the producer will have expected gain: 
II. 
1
2
[𝑝𝑓 + (1 − ℎ)𝜖 − 𝑏 + 𝑝𝑓 − (1 − ℎ)𝜖 − 𝑏] = 𝑝𝑓 − 𝑏 > 0, 
and by concavity of the utility function in gains: 
III. 𝑢(ℎ = 1; 𝑏, 𝛼, 𝜖, 𝑝𝑓) =
(𝑝𝑓−𝑏)
1−𝛼
1−𝛼
 
≥
1
2
 [
(𝑝𝑓+(1−ℎ)𝜖−𝑏)
1−𝛼
1−𝛼
+
(𝑝𝑓−(1−ℎ)𝜖−𝑏)
1−𝛼
1−𝛼
],  ∀ ℎ > ℎ̇  
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         ≥ 
1
2
[
(𝑝𝑓+(1−ℎ)𝜖−𝑏)
1−𝛼
1−𝛼
−
(𝑏−𝑝𝑓+(1−ℎ)𝜖)
1−𝛼
1−𝛼
],  ∀ ℎ < ℎ̇,  
where ℎ̇ is a threshold such that 𝑝𝑓 − (1 − ℎ̇)𝜖 − 𝑏 = 0. In this case, where the futures price is 
higher than the reference, it is still possible that the producer ends up with a utility loss if he 
hedges too little. However, this is never optimal for the producer as captured in the second 
inequality in expression III, because the marginal utility loss is always greater than the marginal 
utility of gain when the futures price is higher than the reference price. To see this, consider ℎ =
ℎ̇, such that the producer’s utility has a limited downside of zero and upside equal to 
(𝑝𝑓+(1−ℎ̇)𝜖−𝑏)
1−𝛼
1−𝛼
.   Then the marginal utility of gain by reducing hedges is (𝑝𝑓 + (1 − ℎ̇)𝜖 −
𝑏)
−𝛼
𝜖, while the marginal utility of loss is (𝑝𝑓 − (1 − ℎ̇)𝜖 − 𝑏)
−𝛼
 𝜖 = 0−𝛼𝜖 = −∞.  Thus, a 
reference-dependent producer who believes that the futures price is unbiased will hedge all of the 
crop when the futures price is above the reference.  
 Case 2. The futures price is below reference: 𝑝𝑓 < 𝑏 and the producer believes the futures price 
is unbiased, π = 1/2. 
Now the producer will always have an expected loss as 
1
2
[𝑝𝑓 + (1 − ℎ)𝜖 − 𝑏 + 𝑝𝑓 −
(1 − ℎ)𝜖 − 𝑏] = 𝑝𝑓 − 𝑏 < 0. Given the convexity of the producer’s utility function in losses, we 
can establish the following: 
IV. 𝑢(ℎ = 1; 𝑏, 𝛼, 𝜖, 𝑝𝑓) = −
(𝑏−𝑝𝑓)1−𝛼
1−𝛼
 
≤ −
1
2
 [
(𝑏−𝑝𝑓−(1−ℎ)𝜖)
1−𝛼
1−𝛼
+
(𝑏−𝑝𝑓+(1−ℎ)𝜖)
1−𝛼
1−𝛼
],  ∀ ℎ > ℎ̇  
≤
1
2
 [
(𝑝𝑓+(1−ℎ)𝜖−𝑏)
1−𝛼
1−𝛼
−
(𝑏−𝑝𝑓+(1−ℎ)𝜖)
1−𝛼
1−𝛼
],  ∀ ℎ < ℎ̇ 
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≤ 
1
2
 [
(𝑝𝑓+𝜖−𝑏)
1−𝛼
1−𝛼
−
(𝑏−𝑝𝑓+𝜖)
1−𝛼
1−𝛼
] = 𝑢(ℎ = 0; 𝑏, 𝛼, 𝜖, 𝑝𝑓)  
The second inequality can be established in the same way as in case 1, whereas in the case of the 
futures price below reference, the marginal utility gain is always greater than the marginal utility 
loss from a reduction in hedging. So the reference-dependent producer will not hedge if the 
futures price is below the reference.   
Case 3. The futures price is equal to reference: 𝑝𝑓 = 𝑏 and the producer believes the futures 
price is unbiased, π = 1/2.  
The utility of the producer with reference-dependence who fully hedges at 𝑝𝑓 = 𝑏 is zero. For 
any deviation from the full hedge, the marginal utility gain and loss will cancel out because the 
utility function is symmetric with respect to the origin as shown in figure 1. Therefore, his 
expected utility is always zero.       
Clearly, for the reference-dependent producer the hedging decision hinges on the level of futures 
price; whereas the EU optimal hedge ratio without reference does not.       || 
 
Proof of Proposition 2. 
Under EU optimal hedging without reference, 𝑏 = 0, the producer’s optimal hedge ratio is  
V. ℎ∗ = 1 −
𝑝𝑓
𝜖
[
π1/𝛼−(1−π)1/𝛼
π1/𝛼+(1−π)1/𝛼
]. 
So for a reference-independent EU maximizing producer, as long as he believes the futures price 
is biased, his optimal hedge ratio will deviate from the full hedge. In particular, the marginal 
effect of higher probability for the futures price to go up on the hedge ratio is:  
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VI. 
𝜕ℎ∗
𝜕π
= −
2𝑝𝑓
𝛼𝜖
[(1−π)π]
1−𝛼
𝛼⁄
[π
1
𝛼⁄ +(1−π)
1
𝛼⁄ ]
2 < 0. 
 As for a reference-dependent producer who believes that the futures price is biased, there 
are still two cases to be considered. 
Case 4. The futures price is above reference: 𝑝𝑓 > 𝑏 and the producer believes that futures price 
is biased, π ≠ 1/2.  
Suppose the producer’s optimal hedge ratio in this case is greater than ℎ̇ = 1 −
𝑝𝑓−𝑏
𝜖
 , his utility 
function is concave. Then the expected utility maximizing hedge ratio takes a similar formulation 
as the reference-independent producer: 
VII. ℎ∗ = 1 −
𝑝𝑓−𝑏
𝜖
[
π1/𝛼−(1−π)1/𝛼
π1/𝛼+(1−π)1/𝛼
],  s.t. ℎ∗>ℎ̇ 
Clearly, the constraint is satisfied as 
π1/𝛼−(1−π)1/𝛼
π1/𝛼+(1−π)1/𝛼
< 1. So a reference-dependent hedger will still 
speculate when the futures price is higher than his reference, but the magnitude of speculation, 
𝜕ℎ∗
𝜕π
= −
2(𝑝𝑓−𝑏)
𝜖𝛼
[(1−𝜋)𝜋]
1−𝛼
𝛼⁄
[𝜋
1
𝛼⁄ +(1−𝜋)
1
𝛼⁄ ]
2 is smaller as the producer will try to avoid utility loss.  
Case 5. The futures price is below reference: 𝑝𝑓 < 𝑏 and the producer believes that futures price 
is biased, π ≠ 1/2.  
As shown in case 2, the producer will not hedge when the unbiased futures price is below 
reference. So a corollary of proposition 1 is: 
If the producer believes the futures price has a higher probability to go up than down, the 
producer will still not hedge.  
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To see this, let us consider the marginal impact of hedging on his expected utility, which can be 
written as:  
VIII. −𝜋𝜖(𝑝𝑓 − 𝑏 + (1 − ℎ)𝜖)−𝛼 + (1 − 𝜋)𝜖(𝑏 − 𝑝𝑓 + (1 − ℎ)𝜖)−𝛼 ≤ 0 
The first term of the expression represents the marginal utility loss from hedging—by increasing 
the hedge ratio the producer locks in the price at a loss. The second term captures the marginal 
utility gain from hedging, as if the bad state is realized, the producers’ utility will be protected 
from going even more negative. Thus, the above equation is always non-positive for 𝜋 ≥ 1/2. 
The only case for the producer to consider a hedge is when the probability of the futures 
price going down is greater than 50%, or π < 1/2. In this situation, the producer’s optimal hedge 
ratio is:  
IX.  ℎ∗ = 1 −
𝑏−𝑝𝑓
𝜖
[
π1/𝛼+(1−π)1/𝛼
(1−π)1/𝛼−π1/𝛼
] ≥ 0. 
Clearly, for the probability of the downward movement, the price needs to be high enough such 
that 
𝑏−𝑝𝑓
𝜖
[
π1/𝛼+(1−π)1/𝛼
(1−π)1/𝛼−π1/𝛼
] < 1. This is a possibility without more parametric restriction. Thus, the 
hedging response in this case is: 
     
𝜕ℎ∗
𝜕π
= {
−
2(𝑝𝑓−𝑏)
𝜖𝛼
[(1−π)π]
1−𝛼
𝛼⁄
[π
1
𝛼⁄ −(1−π)
1
𝛼⁄ ]
2                         𝑖𝑓 
𝑏−𝑝𝑓
𝜖
[
π1/𝛼+(1−π)1/𝛼
(1−π)1/𝛼−π1/𝛼
] < 1
0                                                        𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒.
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Endtnote  
 
1. Sartwelle et al. (2000) find that 70% of grain producers surveyed, 351 respondents in total, 
use forward contracts. Musser, Patrick, and Eckman (1996) and Schroeder et al. (1998) find 
similar adoption rates for forward contracts at 74% and 64%, respectively. Davis et al. (2005) 
and Velandia et al. (2009) find significantly smaller adoption rates at 30.8% and 38%, 
respectively. In a 1999 study, the USDA Agricultural Resource Management (USDA-ARMS 
1999) found that out of 2,662 corn producers, only 12% used forward contracts. Other 
surveys find that farmers who utilize forward contracts use them to hedge 15%–40% of their 
harvest (Schroeder et al. 1998; Davis et al. 2005). 
2. The correlation coefficient between the average basis for five cities where the co-op has a 
presence (data purchased from GeoGrain Inc.) against the change in hedge ratios between 
2009 and 2013 is -0.09, suggesting a limited role of fall basis in hedging during this time 
period.  
3. Adding loss aversion complicates the optimization because of preference reversal around the 
reference point, as the objective function is not globally concave. Mattos, Garcia, and 
Pennings (2008) show that loss aversion only matters to hedge ratios in the presence of 
probability weighting.  
4. Grain marketed in September is likely crop from a prior year; the data do not permit us to 
accurately separate grain marketed from storage and new crop.  Our estimation strategy relies 
on changes in the hedge ratio and price changes. 
5. A potential source of bias in the level of hedge ratio is that the cooperative annual purchases 
could be correlated with prices. However, five-year data is limited to identify such a 
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correlation if any, while our paper is really focusing on the weekly change in the hedge ratio, 
which dominates the variation in the annual cooperative purchase.  
6. The average December futures prices during the pre-harvest season are $4.02, $3.95, $6.42, 
$6.09, and $5.38 per bushel for the years 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013, respectively. 
7. The pre-harvest forward selling motivated by futures price movements shall not be confused 
with the law of supply because the crop supply is perfectly inelastic after the planting decision 
within a crop year.   
8. We refer to the calendar day here; 30 calendar days are equivalent to 22 trading days. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE WEATHER PREMIUM IN THE U.S. CORN MARKET 
 
Abstract  
We show that the weather premium, an anecdotal phenomenon in the US corn futures 
market, can arise from a convex and asymmetric demand function. We also show that the 
magnitude of the weather premium will depend on the carry over and expected yield at harvest. 
We then use data from 1968 to 2015 to evaluate the accuracy of the December futures price as a 
forecast of the maturity price on this contract. We identify a predictable component in the 
forecast errors that is consistent with the existence of a time-varying weather premium. We show 
that a passive strategy of routinely shorting the corn December futures does not provide an 
attractive risk-adjusted return. 
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Introduction 
Participants in the US corn futures market often refer to a “weather premium”. This 
premium, if it exists, suggests that the price of the December futures contract in spring will over 
predict the actual harvest price more often than not. Over the last 50 years, the spring December 
futures price on average overestimated the realized harvest price by 4 percent. A predominant 
argument for the motivation of weather premium is the supposition that a weather event that 
results in negative shocks to supply causes a larger increase in prices than does the price 
reduction associated with a weather event that causes a positive supply shock. To the best of our 
knowledge, the academic literature has yet to formally define and explore the weather premium.  
The goal of this paper is to analyze whether and to what extent the weather premium 
exists in the corn futures market. We show theoretically that a convex demand curve alone will 
give rise to the weather premium, which we define as the difference between the expected 
harvest price and the price at expected harvest. This differs from the definition of the risk 
premium, which refers to the deviation of the futures price deviates from the expected harvest 
price.  
We then explore the forces that should influence the weather premium. We show that the 
asymmetry of the demand curve for grains caused by storage causes the weather premium to be 
dependent on the level as well as the variance of expected supply at harvest. We test these 
theoretical predictions by studying the forecast errors of corn December futures from 1968 to 
2015. A predicable component of the forecast error that varies overtime with the distribution of 
the expected supply is consistent with the existence of weather premium. We find that the 
carryout and recent yield realizations, the key determinants of the expected supply, do provide 
statistically significant explanatory power for the variations in the forecast errors. In an out-of-
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sample forecast evaluation, the futures prices adjusted for the estimated weather premium 
performs better than the unadjusted future prices.  
Finally, we evaluate several trading strategies that aim to take advantage of the weather 
premium. Routinely shorting the corn December futures that is often recommended by 
Commodity Trading Advisories does provide a positive expected return. However, we find that 
the Sharpe ratio of this passive strategy is too small to justify such an approach.  
 
Previous Work  
The previous literature examining possible bias in the grain futures markets can be 
categorized into two strands: 1) those based on the theory of storage, and 2) those based on the 
theory of normal backwardation.  
The theory of storage assumes an implicit benefit of holding inventory, i.e. convenience 
yield (Working 1949), which is inferred from the temporal basis, i.e. the difference between the 
futures price and the cash price. The literature posits that the inventory level is negatively 
correlated with the convenience yield (Fama and French 1987 and Carbonez et al. 2009), but 
how it links to the expected premium, i.e. the bias in the futures price, is less clear. Fama and 
French (1987) show the temporal basis has little value in explaining the premium in the corn 
futures contracts over a variety of time horizons, if there is any. Gorton et al (2013) use actual 
inventory data to approach this problem and arrive at a similar conclusion 
On the other hand, the theory of normal backwardation (Keynes 1930), also known as the 
hedging pressure hypothesis, postulates that risk-averse short hedgers will pay a premium to the 
speculator to bear the spot price risk. This phenomenon may only apply to markets in which 
there are majorities of hedgers with natural long positions. Among such markets are those for 
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agricultural commodities.  However, there is little empirical support for normal backwardation 
(Frank and Garcia 2009 and Gorton et al. 2013).  For example, among those that report to the 
CFTC, the performances of larger speculators is largely random (Hartzmark 1991), despite a 
small subset of speculators that appear to consistently outperform the markets (Aulerich, Irwin 
and Garcia, 2013).   
Weather during the growing season is the most important determinant of the harvest price 
forecast error. The correlation between the year-to-year change in harvest prices and yields is -
74% over the period 1968-2015.  Figure 1 illustrates that the monthly average of December 
futures prices prior to July is about 4% higher than the final harvest prices, approximated by the 
October average price of the December futures. After July, the average for this difference goes to 
zero. 
 
Figure 1. Density plots of monthly average of December futures price of corn minus the 
harvest price, expressed as a percentage of the harvest price, 1968- 2015 
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Good’s (2016) work using data during the mid-1970s to mid-1990s showed that the 
tendency for the market to over predict the actual harvest price may be owed to the volatility in 
yield.  In response, commodity trading advisories (CTAs) have advocated trading strategies to 
take advantage of this statistical phenomena (e.g. Till 2000, 2001 and 2005), and their central 
working hypothesis is that the market is loss-averse and is willing to pay a premium to insure 
against adverse weather shocks. In other words, a passive short strategy on average will yield a 
positive return.  
There are other potential sources of expected premium in the futures markets. Under the 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM), the risk premium in futures markets is proportional to the 
covariance of the futures return with the return on the market portfolio. However, there is little 
empirical evidence that the agricultural futures returns are correlated with the equity returns 
(Jagannathan, 1985 and Bessembinder, 1992).  
 There is a vast literature on futures pricing models and how hedgers and speculators 
respond to futures prices and also the types of biases or pressures that exist that generate 
premiums for certain positions. Still, we do not have concrete evidence on the source of the bias 
in commodities futures markets, specifically for grain commodities.  This article explores 
weather premium as a potential source of bias.  Also, the empirical work to date have focused on 
the use of futures contracts to gauge the behavior of trading responses.  We extend this to pay 
specific attention to the harvest futures contract. 
 
Theoretical Framework   
In this section, we formalize the concept of the weather premium, and derive the 
comparative statics regarding what influence the magnitude of the weather premium.  
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Suppose a deterministic demand function for corn 𝐷(𝑝𝑇) is convex in 𝑝𝑇, the harvest 
price of corn in year T, such that 𝐷′(𝑝𝑇) < 0, and 𝐷′′(𝑝𝑇) > 0. Given the supply 𝑆𝑇 at harvest is 
perfectly inelastic consisting of both the new production, 𝑧𝑇 and carryout available at harvest 𝑐𝑇, 
the equilibrium price function, 𝑝𝑇(𝑆𝑇) > 0 is also convex.  For future time periods further from 
harvest (i.e. Spring in the case of corn in the Northern Hemisphere), 𝑡 < 𝑇, there is uncertainty in 
the harvest size, so the only state variable is the carryout amount from the prior marketing year, 
𝑐𝑡. By Jensen’s inequality,:  
(1) 𝐸𝑡[𝑝𝑇(𝑆𝑇)] − 𝑝𝑇[𝐸(𝑆𝑇)] ≥ 0,  
where 𝐸𝑡 is the expectation operator conditional on the information available at time t. The 
inequality suggests that the difference between the expectation of the price and the price at the 
expected harvest quantity is positive. We term this difference, 𝐸𝑡[𝑝𝑇(𝑆𝑇)] − 𝑝𝑇[𝐸(𝑆𝑇)], as the 
weather premium because weather is the primary determinant of yield once a crop has been 
planted, and therefore also determines the harvest quantity. Graphically, the line segment 
between point b and point d in figure 2 traces out the weather premium. By a visual inspection, 
the weather premium is unlikely to be a constant from year-to-year as it depends on 1) the 
carryout and 2) the ex-ante market expectation of the new harvest quantity. 
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Figure 2. Graphic demonstration of weather premium. 
 
Denote the cost of carry, 𝑔(𝑐𝑇|𝑐𝑡),  as the cost of storing 𝑐𝑇 amount of corn from time 𝑡 
to the harvest time T with the initial carryout available 𝑐𝑡. According to the rational expectation 
competitive storage model, the cost of carry is equal to the difference between the expected 
harvest price 𝐸𝑡[𝑝𝑇(𝑆𝑇)] and the spot price 𝑝𝑡, i.e. the temporal basis: 
(2)     𝐸𝑡[𝑝𝑇(𝑆𝑇)] − 𝑝𝑡 = 𝑔(𝑐𝑇|𝑐𝑡). 
Suppose the risk premium is zero, then the futures price 𝑓𝑡,𝑇 is equal to the expected harvest price 
𝐸𝑡[𝑝𝑇(𝑆𝑇)], and equation 2 can be rewritten as: 
(3)  𝑓𝑡,𝑇 − 𝑝𝑡 = 𝑔(𝑐𝑇|𝑐𝑡). 
If the inverse of the cost of carry function 𝑔(∙) exists, then we can express the carryout available 
at this year’s harvest as: 
(4) 𝑐𝑇 =  𝑔
−1(𝑐𝑡, 𝑓𝑡,𝑇 − 𝑝𝑡). 
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In other words, the ending stock from the last marketing year is dependent on a price-based 
signal.  Thus, the temporal basis should contain information about the weather premium.  
As shown in equation (4) that the inter-marketing year carry and the temporal basis are 
co-determined. In good harvest years, the temporal basis tends to be positive to incentivize the 
market to store forward; while in bad years the price may spike due to the market’s inability to 
borrow from the future. Deaton and Laroque (1992) shows that this dynamics will cause the 
demand curve to asymmetric, and there is a threshold level of supply, above which the 
equilibrium price becomes much less sensitive to further increases in supply. This characteristic 
of the grain equilibrium price function implies that the weather premium will decrease as the 
expected supply at harvest increases.  
To show this mathematically with a continuous demand function, we assume a negative 
third derivative, 𝐷′′′(𝑝𝑇) < 0. This ensures the negative slope of the demand curve holds for all 
possible values of the price. For analytic tractability, further assume that the realization of 
harvest follows an i.i.d. binominal distribution:  
(5)  𝑧𝑇 = {
𝑧̅ + 𝜖,             with probablity  
1
2
  
𝑧̅ − 𝜖,            with probablity  
1
2
. 
where 𝑧̅ is the market’s expectation about the size of harvest.  In this way, the realized harvest 
amount is random and conditional on 𝑧̅, either higher or lower by 0 < 𝜖 < 𝑧̅, with equal 
probabilities.  
Given (1) - (5), it is straightforward to show how the weather premium will vary with the 
expectation of the supply at harvest and its associated variation, which we summarize into the 
following comparative statics: 
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(6) {
1
2
[
𝜕𝑝𝑇
𝜕𝑐𝑇
|𝑆𝑇=?̅?+𝑐𝑇−𝜖 +
𝜕𝑝𝑇
𝜕𝑐𝑇
|𝑆𝑇=?̅?+𝑐𝑇+𝜖] −
𝜕𝑝𝑇
𝜕𝑐𝑇
|𝑆𝑇=?̅?+𝑐𝑇 ≤ 0
1
2
[
𝜕𝑝𝑇
𝜕?̅?
|𝑆𝑇=?̅?+𝑐𝑇−𝜖 +
𝜕𝑝𝑇
𝜕?̅?
|𝑆𝑇=?̅?+𝑐𝑇+𝜖] −
𝜕𝑝𝑇
𝜕?̅?
|𝑆𝑇=?̅?+𝑐𝑇 ≤ 0
. 
(7) −
𝜕𝑝𝑇
𝜕𝜖
|𝑆𝑇=?̅?+𝑐𝑇−𝜖 +
𝜕𝑝𝑇
𝜕𝜖
|𝑆𝑇=?̅?+𝑐𝑇+𝜖 > 0. 
Comparative statics 6 show that an increase in expected supply at harvest, due to increases in 
either the expected harvest quantity or the carryout, will have a negative impact on the weather 
premium.  On the other hand, an increase in the variability of the harvest as captured by 𝜖causes 
the weather premium to increases as shown in the expression 7. Figure 3 is a visual description 
of this result. As the harvest variability increases from 𝜖 to 𝜖′, holding the mean of the total 
supply constant, the weather premium increases.   
        
Figure 3. Graphic demonstration of weather premium. 
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The weather premium is a phenomenon that arises from the property of the demand curve 
without implying a biased futures price. Deaton and Laroque (1992) demonstrate that with a 
convex demand curve, the equilibrium price distribution is skewed to the right with the left tail 
‘thinning out’ because inventory holders buy at low prices.  Inventory is limited in its ability to 
reduce the right tail because the reduction in supply due to a lower than expected harvest can 
overwhelm the existing size of inventory. In other words, the mean of this price distribution is 
greater than the median. Our theoretical analysis demonstrates a similar point, but complements 
the work of Deaton and Laroque (1992) by formally defining weather premium, which takes 
place within a marketing season in the harvest futures prices, whereas Deaton and Laroque focus 
on the year-to-year variation of cash prices.  
From the perspective of risk aversion, a common narrative also consistent with the 
comparative statics (6) states that increasing carryout, which serves as a buffer for the adverse 
weather shocks, reduces the weather premium. The remaining carryout of corn is often very 
small as compared to the size of expected new crop at the time of harvest, so a negative supply 
shock can cause the price to spike, regardless. In other words, if the weather premium is indeed a 
risk premium such that  𝑓𝑡,𝑇 > 𝐸𝑡[𝑝𝑇(𝑆𝑇)], the difference between the futures price and expected 
harvest price, i.e. the premium, should not vary year over year with the carryout alone.  
 
Empirical Procedure 
In the previous section, we show how the expected supply at harvest, including both the 
carryout and the expected size of the new harvest, might affect the weather premium. To bring 
the theoretical framework to the data, we focus the empirical analysis on the forecast errors of 
the December futures contract of corn as a predictor of the realized harvest price. The logic is 
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that before the growing season of each year, the futures market will build in the weather 
premium according expression (1), but when an average or above weather condition is realized, 
the spring futures price will then over predict the actual harvest price, i.e. a positive forecast 
error. In other words, our identification of the existence of weather premium depends on to what 
extent the forecast error variation can be captured by the variables describing the distribution of 
the expected harvest size, which we discuss in the next subsection. Quantify the magnitude of the 
weather premium is beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
Forecast errors 
 We evaluate the monthly average price of the corn December futures contract traded on 
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) as the forecast price for the U.S. corn harvest price, 
covering the first six months of each calendar year from 1968 to 2015. Following the procedure 
used by the United State Department of Agriculture (USDA) Risk Management Agency (RMA), 
we use the average of the December futures prices during October as the approximate harvest 
price. The forecast error is just the difference between the log forecast price and the log harvest 
price. Figure 4 shows that the forecast errors in the December futures price appear random 
between January and June. 
  
 
 
8
7
 
 
Figure 4. Forecast errors by months from January to June, 1968- 2015 
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Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the forecast errors of each month from January 
to September over the period of 1968 to 2015. The logarithm difference between the spring corn 
futures price and the final harvest price ranges from 0.030 to 0.044. Interestingly, the monthly 
forecast errors increase in magnitude during the spring season. The standard deviations of the 
forecast errors decline rapidly from July to September, but remain remarkably stable over the 
spring at approximately 20% of the harvest price. Notice the forecast errors before June are 
skewed to the left, but change in July from negative to positive skewness. This indicates that the 
information content in July, on average, pushes the forecast errors towards zero. Also, the change 
in kurtosis in July indicates a heavier tail in the forecast error distribution, which is often 
accompanied with the new information shocks.  
 
Table 1. Summary statistics of the forecast errors by months, defined as the log averages of the 
December futures price minus the log October average of the December futures, 1968-2015. 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep 
Mean 0.030 0.036 0.041 0.041 0.036 0.044 0.026 0.015 0.003 
Std. Dev 0.205 0.203 0.203 0.205 0.197 0.191 0.134 0.097 0.071 
Skewness -0.724 -0.661 -0.574 -0.517 -0.526 -0.222 0.343 0.067 0.659 
Kurtosis -0.032 -0.057 -0.384 -0.165 -0.277 0.338 1.521 1.571 4.156 
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Carryout and temporal basis  
On a year-to-year basis, carryout is the sum of last marketing year’s ending stock and 
harvest published in USDA WASDE reports. We detrend the carryout by its past 5-year average 
to obtain a unit-free measure of normal inventory level. This initial level of carryout together 
with the temporal basis, defined as the logarithm of the difference between the December futures 
price and the price on the nearby futures contract, determines the inventory to be carried to the 
next harvest. The continuous nearby futures price is constructed by rolling into the next nearby 
futures contract on the last trading day of the expiring contract.  As demonstrated earlier, ceteris 
paribus, the weather premium should fall as carryout increases.  
Figure 5 plots the normalized carryout, showing a wide range of year-to-year change 
from the past trend with a 36% increase in 1980 and a negative 20% in 2013. We also add the 
monthly basis series in figure 4, and it is shown to be highly correlated with the level of carryout.  
 
Figure 5. Normalized carryout versus the monthly temporal basis between January and June, 
1968- 2015 
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Past yield realization  
The other important determinant of the weather premium is harvest size, which is joint 
determined by the acreage planted and yield. Planting area is a choice variable by producers that 
is mainly explained by the futures price, cash price and government programs (Chavas, 1983), 
but not the weather.   Therefore, we focus on the role of yield variability, a factor most 
influenced by weather. To measure the relative level and variability of yield, we propose two 
variables: the log change of last year’s crop from its 5-year trend yield, and the 5-year mean-
normalized yield, respectively. Denoting 𝑦𝑡 as the corn yield in year t, the variability of the yield 
realizations, 𝑣𝑦𝑡 is measured as the standard deviation of the rolling 5-year yield normalized by 
its mean, calculated by:  
(8) 𝑣𝑦𝑡 = √5∑ (𝑦𝑖 −∑ 𝑦𝑖
𝑡−1
𝑖=𝑡−5
𝑡−1
𝑖=𝑡−5 )
2/∑ 𝑦𝑖
𝑡−1
𝑖=𝑡−5 . 
The level of the yield realization is the logarithm change of last year’s crop yield from a trend 
yield of past five years: 
(9) 𝑑𝑦𝑡 = log(𝑦𝑡) − log (∑ 𝑦𝑖
𝑡−1
𝑖=𝑡−5 ). 
Intuitively, to the extent that the recent yield realization influences market participants’ 
subjective yield distribution, it may also impact the weather premium. Figures 6 shows that the 
yield variability has declined since the late 1990s, but that weather still prevails as the dominant 
factor: the yield dropped 20 percent from the trend yield when the drought hit the corn harvest in 
U.S. in 2012.
  
 
 
9
1
 
 
Figure 6. Last year’s yield realization from 5-year trend vs. the standard deviation of the yield realization in the past five years, 1968- 
2015. 
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Empirical specification  
To understand the role of these factors, we estimate the following simple empirical 
equation of the forecast error:  
(10) 𝑒𝑡,𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽4𝑣𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑑𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡,𝑗 + 𝜌𝑗 + 𝜉𝑡𝑗  
where the forecast error in year t of month j,  𝑒𝑡,𝑗 ≡ log (𝑓𝑡,𝑗) − log (𝑠𝑡), the monthly December 
futures price of year t in month j minus the actual harvest price in year t, depends on last year’s 
normalized carry from last year, 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑡−1, relative yield realization 𝑑𝑦𝑡−1 as well as yield 
variability 𝑣𝑦𝑡−1.  Carryout enters with a quadratic term to account for its potential nonlinear 
relationship with the weather premium. This year’s explanatory variable is a price-based signal 
𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡,𝑗.  Unobserved monthly fixed effects,𝜌𝑗′𝑠, are the difference in the conditional average 
expected premium in month 𝑗 from the average of other months.  The remaining disturbance 
term, 𝜉𝑡𝑗 , satisfies the i.i.d.  assumption.  
While a simple linear regression, a nice feature of regression equation (10) is that from a 
forecasting efficiency perspective, it encompasses the futures price and, by extension, all 
information embedded in the futures price. To see this, denote 𝑠𝑡,?̂? the model forecast of the 
harvest price in month j, which is the average December futures price adjusted for estimated 
weather premium in that month:  
(11) 𝑠𝑡,?̂? = 𝑓𝑡,𝑗 − 𝑒𝑡,?̃?. 
Then the model forecast error can be calculated as the difference between the forecast error of 
unadjusted futures prices and the estimated premium:  
(12) 𝑠𝑡,?̂? − 𝑠𝑡 = 𝑒𝑡,?̃? − 𝑒𝑡,𝑗.  
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Notice that the term on the right-hand side of equation (12), 𝑒𝑡,?̃? − 𝑒𝑡,𝑗, is the negative residual in 
equation (10), 𝜉𝑡𝑗 , and by construct, is not correlated with the model fitted values, namely the 
estimated weather premium, 𝑒𝑡,?̃?.   
For practitioners, our proposed empirical strategy is only useful if it provides a better out-
of-sample forecasting performance. We compare the predictive success of different model 
specifications in terms of the reduction in mean squared prediction error (MSPE) from the no-
change forecast. The reduction in MSPE is the ratio of the MSPE of the model-adjusted futures 
price to the MSPE of the no-change forecast (Baumeister and Kilian, 2016). Thus, any model 
with MSPE ratio greater than one is inadmissible as it adds more noise than explanatory power. 
The statistical significance of the MSPE reduction is assessed using a test proposed by Clark and 
West (2007) that accounts for the noise introduced by additional explanatory variables.  
 
Results  
As reported in table 2, the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test does not detect 
significant variation across months, i.e. there is no panel effect. Therefore, the parameters are 
estimated using OLS regression of the pooled sample and robust standard errors are reported. 
Column 1 and 2 in table 2 provide results on whether the forecast errors of the December 
corn futures prices can be explained by the temporal basis and carryout respectively. The 
temporal basis by itself does not appear to contain any predictive information and the R2 is close 
to zero. The normalized carryout explains some variation in the expected premium with R2 = 
0.07. The marginal effect is statistically significant and negative when evaluated compared to the 
carryout at the preceding 5-year-trend. This supports the theoretical prediction derived from the 
comparative statics equation (6): an increase in expected supply at harvest, due to increases in 
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either the expected harvest or the carryout, will have a negative impact on the weather premium. 
The regression results including both temporal basis and carryout are reported in column 3, this 
model specification results in an improved R2 of 0.11. The magnitude of improvement is also 
statistically significant as suggested by the F-test with p-value 0.0003. In addition, the marginal 
effect of carryout remains negative, while the parameter estimate on the temporal basis becomes 
statistically significant at the 5% level.  This empirical observation strengthens the need to 
consider both temporal basis and carryout. Intuitively, the temporal basis only tells us how much 
the market is compensating for the carryout of inventory, and it needs to be combined with the 
initial carryout level to determine the level of inventory still available at the upcoming harvest, 
which plays a direct role in determining the weather premium.  
Column 4 of table 2 shows that the R2 increases to 0.15 when past yield realizations are 
included in the model. Consistent with the theoretical predictions from comparative statics, 
increasing yield volatility tends to be followed by an increase in the weather premium. The level 
of last year’s yield relative to the trend has an expected negative impact on the weather premium. 
This may be due to a behavioral mindset among commodity traders who over estimate expected 
yield volatility in years after a weather shock.   
Figure 7 plots the time series of the predicted log forecast errors in February from the 
regression equation (10). As discussed earlier, the predictive component in the forecast errors of 
the December futures related to the carryout and yield realizations is consistent with the 
existence of the weather premium.  The time series in figure 6 shows negative model forecasts in 
some years while in theory the weather premium should be nonnegative. In this unconstrained 
estimation, the model forecast would pick up random variations in the actual forecast errors other 
than the weather premium.  
95 
 
 
 
Table 2. Pooled OLS Estimation of Parameters and Robust Standard Errors Based on the Corn 
December futures forecast errors, 1968–2015.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Basis only 
Carryout 
only 
Basis + 
Carryout 
Full model 
Intercept 0.0379*** -0.1346 0.4751*** -0.9327*** 
 (0.0117) (0.1178) (0.0899) (0.1085) 
𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠 0.0929 
 
0.5512*** 0.6185*** 
 (0.1407) 
 
(0.0526) (0.0588) 
𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 
 
0.7406*** -0.2153 2.0349*** 
 
 
(0.2542) (0.2036) (0.2477) 
𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡2 
 
0.5343*** -0.1795 -1.0715*** 
 
 
(0.1341) (0.1169) (0.1390) 
Last year’s yield deviation 
from trend 
   
-0.5577*** 
 
   
(0.0267) 
Recent yield variability 
   
0.6503*** 
 
   
(0.0227) 
𝑅2 0.0020 0.0720 0.1135 0.1531 
BP test for Random Effect 0.0912 0.0880 0.1382 0.1546 
BP test for 
Heteroskedasticity 
0.0250 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
F-test   0.0003 <0.0001 
Marginal Impact of Carryout  
 
-0.3279*** -0.5742*** -0.1081*** 
at trend 
 
(0.0263) (0.0546) (0.0368) 
     
Notes. Estimated robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance 
levels as follows: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; and *** 1 percent significance.  Breusch-Pagan test 
are performed against random effect and heteroscedasticity respectively, and p-values are 
reported. The p-values of F-test that comparison the model specification 2 and 3, 3 and 4 are 
reported.  
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Though we can never observe the true weather premium, the model estimate of an 
empirical weather premium can offer some insights into its characteristics. First, contrary to the 
risk premium paradigm, the estimated weather premium shows considerable year-to-year 
variations. Moreover, the average of the estimated weather premium is about 4% of the actual 
harvest prices, which is very close to the arithmetic average of the forecast errors as shown in 
table 1. In other words, the difference between the spring December futures prices and the actual 
harvest prices can be largely accounted for by the covariates specified in equation 10.  
Figure 8 plots the forecast errors of the December futures with and without adjusting for 
the estimated weather premium, and the former does offer a superior forecast from a visual 
inspection. 
 
Figure 7. Estimated logarithm of the weather premium in February, 1968-2015 
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Figure 8. Log forecast errors of unadjusted versus adjusted December futures prices in 
February, 1968-2015 
 
To gain further understanding about the properties of weather premium, we plot actual 
harvest prices with the model predicted price for the latest 10 years in figure 9. The model 
forecast prices appears to be no higher than the December futures price before the summer 
growing season. Thus in years when the futures price overestimates the actual harvest prices, the 
weather-premium-adjusted futures price performs better in terms of resulting in smaller forecast 
error. 
 
Out-of-sample performance 
We first examine whether the December futures price of corn, adjusted or not, contains 
additional information about the upcoming harvest price in comparison to a no-change forecast 
from last year. We use data from, 1996 to 2015 as our forecast evaluation period and calculate 
the initial parameter estimates based on data from 1968 to 1995. Table 3 presents the one-step 
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forward recursive estimations of MSPE ratios separated by months. The MSPE ratio of 
unadjusted futures price is presented in column 1. In column 2 we present the MSPE ratio of the 
model with carryout as explanatory variables only, and progressively add yield level, yield 
variability as well as temporal basis into the model, with the corresponding MSPE ratios 
presented in columns 3, 4 and 5 respectively. This is a simple procedure for model selection, 
which is important for out-of-sample forecast because of the bias-variance tradeoff (Kilian et al 
2015): some variables may add more variance to forecasting in spite of their in-sample 
explanatory power.  
 
Figure 9. Actual harvest price, futures prices and model forecast, 2006-2015 
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Table 3. Out-of-Sample Forecast Comparisons to No-Change Forecast from Last Year’s Harvest 
Price, Based on Monthly Recursive Estimates of MSPE Ratios with Evaluation Period: 1996–
2015 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Mon
th 
Unadjusted 
futures 
Carryout 
only 
Carryout + yield 
level 
Carryout + yield 
level/variability 
Full 
model 
Jan 0.754 0.749 0.752 0.812 0.777 
Feb 0.825 0.806 0.807 0.870 0.865 
Mar 0.962 0.934 0.938 0.998 1.028 
Apr 1.073 1.045 1.043 1.104 1.184 
May 1.026 1.008 0.996 1.051 1.177 
Jun 1.107 1.102 1.089 1.139 1.253 
Note. West and Clark (2007) test statistic is reported, which follows the student t-distribution 
with critical values of 1.96 and 2.33 at 5% and 1% significance level respectively.    
 
The t-statistics of West and Clarks (2007) shows that the out-of-sample forecast 
performances of all forecasts from January to June on average are significantly superior to a no 
change forecast. The month-to-month comparisons of forecasts need to be interpreted with 
caution, given for each month we have only 20 observations for forecast evaluation. That said, 
there is a strong pattern of deteriorating predictive success of all forecasts from January to June, 
this renders those after March inadmissible because they result in higher variances of prediction 
errors than a no-change forecast. This pattern might be due to the increasing trading in the 
December futures contracts as the planting and growing season progresses As discussed earlier, 
there appears to be an increase in the weather premium in June, this is the time of the year the 
market focuses on weather. But the increase in weather premium in June does not seem to be 
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justified by the subsequent realizations of harvest price in most years. This leads to the 
underperformance in June forecasts in comparison to other months.   
Table 4 presents the rolling estimations of MSPE ratios, which might be preferable in the 
presence of unknown structural breaks. However, the MSPE ratios from the rolling estimation 
are very similar to that of the recursive forecast. This in part justifies our use of a parsimonious 
regression model, which implicitly assumes that the dynamic structure of the weather premium 
described by the carryout and realizations of yield in the past is time-invariant 
  
Table 4. Out-of-Sample Forecast Comparisons to No-Change Forecast from Last Year’s Harvest 
Price, Based on Monthly Rolling Estimates of MSPE Ratios with Evaluation Period: 1996–2015 
Month 
Unadjusted 
futures 
Carryout 
only 
Carryout + 
yield level 
Carryout + yield 
level/variability 
Full 
model 
Jan 0.754 0.755 0.758 0.868 0.852 
Feb 0.825 0.804 0.808 0.921 0.9147 
Mar 0.962 0.923 0.931 1.038 1.086 
Apr 1.073 1.032 1.037 1.141 1.268 
May 1.026 0.993 0.990 1.086 1.277 
Jun 1.107 1.073 1.072 1.144 1.281 
WC-test for 
MSPE ratio 
4.790 3.850 3.775 3.824 3.261 
Note.  West and Clark (2007) test statistic is reported, which follows the student t-distribution 
with critical values of 1.96 and 2.33 at 5% and 1% significance level respectively. 
101 
 
 
 
To further evaluate the model forecast accuracy, we construct the ratios of MSPE of 
model forecasts over the unadjusted February futures price, which is adopted by the USDA 
RMA as the market projected harvest prices. The column 1 of table 5 presents the MSPE of 
unadjusted futures price, the February average futures price outperforms all other months except 
for January. The pattern of increasing forecast error variances from January to June is also 
observed for adjusted futures prices. However, the out-of-sample forecast errors both generated 
by futures prices adjusted for last year’s carryout, and the futures price adjusted for carryout plus 
the normalized yield level of last year are smaller in dispersions than that of the unadjusted 
futures price in every month, such that the six months’ average MSPE reduction are statistically 
significant at 5% level.  
Table 5. Out-of-Sample Forecast Comparisons to the unadjusted futures price, Based on 
Monthly Recursive Estimates of MSPE Ratios with Evaluation Period: 1996–2015 
Month 
Unadjusted 
futures 
Carryout 
only 
Carryout + 
yield level 
Carryout + yield 
level/variability 
Full 
model 
Jan 0.914 0.908 0.911 0.984 0.987 
Feb 1.000 0.977 0.978 1.055 1.057 
Mar 1.166 1.132 1.137 1.210 1.246 
Apr 1.301 1.267 1.265 1.339 1.473 
May 1.243 1.222 1.207 1.274 1.487 
Jun 1.342 1.336 1.320 1.380 1.502 
WC-test for 
MSPE ratio 
 1.758 2.100 0.593 0.387 
Note. West and Clark (2007) test statistic is reported, which follows the student t-distribution 
with critical values of 1.64 and 1.96 at 5% and 1% significance level respectively.   
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Trading strategies using corn December futures  
Suppose an investor wants to take advantage of the weather premium in the corn futures 
market. One strategy as recommended by CTAs (e.g. Till, 2000) is to passively shorting in the 
December futures contracts in spring and cover in October when the market take all the weather 
premium out. Panel A in table 6 presents the return and variation of this strategy for each month. 
The speculator’s return is measured as the ratio of negative price change of the December futures 
from the spring months to October, over the spring price of the December futures, at which he 
enters the trade. It appears that the best month to execute this trade is June, which produces an 
average return of 2.5% and standard deviation of 19.2%. If we use breakeven as the benchmark, 
then the Sharpe ratio of this passive strategy is 0.13. This is much lower than that of S&P 500 
index that during the same time period has produced a Sharpe ratio of 0.46.  
An alternative strategy is to utilize the correlation between the weather premium and the 
level of carryout: short the December futures in spring and cover in October, only when the 
carryout level is below the preceding 5-year average. The results are presented in Panel B of 
table 6. The Sharpe ratio of this active short strategy is highest in January equal to 0.62, or 9.5% 
return with 15.5% standard deviation, this is much better than the passive short program. The 
Sharpe ratio of this strategy is gradually declining throughout the growing seasons from January 
to June. However, this strategy should be used with caution for there are only 14 years when the 
carryout falls below trend.  
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Table 6. Returns of Selected Strategies using corn December futures contract, 1968 -2015.  
Strategies 
Arithmetic 
Average 
Standard 
Deviation 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
      Panel A: Short in spring and cover in October 
Jan 0.008 0.221 0.037 
Feb 0.015 0.216 0.070 
Mar 0.020 0.212 0.092 
Apr 0.020 0.213 0.093 
May 0.016 0.205 0.079 
Jun 0.025 0.192 0.132 
Panel B: Short in spring and cover in October, when carryout below trend 
Jan 0.094 0.152 0.619 
Feb 0.095 0.155 0.612 
Mar 0.093 0.164 0.567 
Apr 0.090 0.171 0.529 
May 0.076 0.186 0.407 
Jun 0.082 0.180 0.459 
       Panel C: Other alternatives 
Buy in Jan and Cover in June, 
when carryout above trend 
0.029 0.157 0.185 
S&P 500 Index 0.078 0.165 0.476 
Note.  Results of panel A are based on 48 years of data, from 1968 to 2015. Results of Panel B 
are based on the 14 years of data when the carryout is below the average of the past 5 years. 
Panel C result is based on the 34 years of data, when the carryout is above the past trend. Data 
source of historical S&P 500 Index: 
https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/%5EGSPC/history?p=%5EGSPC. 
  
Finally, the opposite of taking an active short strategy would be to go long the December 
futures when the carryout is above the trend. In particular, the speculator will initial the long 
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position in January and cover at the end of June. The logic of this trade is that an above average 
carryout shifts the mean of the supply distribution to right, corresponding the part of demand 
curve that is very elastic. The downside price movement in this case is limited even when the 
weather is good, while the upside price movement is significantly larger should bad weather 
outcomes prevail. The market will price in this asymmetry into the December futures until July 
when the weather condition is realized. Panel C of table 6 shows that the average return of this 
strategy is 3% with 16% standard deviation. Though measured by the Sharpe ratio this strategy 
did not appear to beat the active short strategy during this particular period, but it performs better 
than the passive short program.   
 
Conclusion 
We define the weather premium as the difference between the expected harvest price and 
the harvest price at expected supply. The weather premium should be nonnegative in theory, and 
its magnitude will vary with the carryout and the yield distribution because of the convex and 
asymmetric demand function of grain crops. Our empirical analysis shows a time-varying 
predictable component of the forecast errors of the December corn futures whose properties is 
consistent with those of the weather premium. Adjusting the spring prices of December futures 
by the model estimates of weather premium leads to significant out-of-sample reduction of 
MSPE.  
 Any model forecast claims to perform better than the market-based futures price should 
be treated with skepticism. The out-of-sample evaluations are generally sensitive to the length of 
forecast window. In this paper, we use the window of the most recent 20 years. Our empirical 
results suggest that in years when the adverse weather outcomes do not occur, the magnitude of 
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decrease in December futures from spring to the harvest is partially explainable by the carryout 
and yields.  
Given the limited number of observations, it is impossible to measure whether and to 
what extent the market overestimates the probability of adverse weather outcomes. The forecast 
errors on average greater than zero may just be a historical aberration given the short time series. 
However, the fact that the weather premium is present in the data despite numerous commodity 
trading strategies designed to take advantage of this premium is telling. This finding has 
important implication for corn producers engaged in pre-harvest hedging activities. They would 
be better off to hedge significant bigger portion of their expected harvest to take advantage of the 
premium, especially in years when the carryout is smaller than average.   
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